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Patents as Credentials 
Jason Rantanen*  
Sarah E. Jack** 
Abstract 
The conventional explanation for why people seek patents 
draws on a simple economic rationale. Patents, the usual story goes, 
provide a financial reward: the ability to engage in 
supracompetitive pricing by excluding others from practicing the 
claimed technology. People are drawn to file for patents because 
that is how these economic rewards are secured. While scholars 
have proposed variations on the basic exclusionary mechanism, and 
there is a general acknowledgement that patents can affect a firm’s 
reputation, the actual mechanisms of patents’ effect on 
individuals — human beings — remains relatively uncharted.  
In this Article we offer a concrete theory and framework for 
understanding the relationship between patents and individuals in 
terms other than the lure of supracompetitive pricing. Our 
framework focuses on the idea of patents as credentials: formal 
abstractions of a person’s inventive nature. By acting as boundaried 
and identifiable indicators, patents serve purposes beyond the 
strictly exclusionary. One purpose is to satisfy social or self-worth 
needs. The formalization of invention through a patent allows those 
human beings who want to be recognized by society as inventors to 
be so recognized, thus fulfilling an innate human desire. A second 
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purpose is economic—but not because of the power to exclude. 
Instead, as the literature has recognized on the firm level, viewing 
patents as credentials acknowledges their role as economic signals, 
indicating particular characteristics possessed by the recipient.  
Considered in these terms, patents serving as credentials are 
all around us, from resumes and curriculum vitae to framed 
patents in offices. But these examples only scratch the surface of the 
role of patents as credentials in our society. By using the formal lens 
of patents as credentials, we demonstrate that there are reasons why 
individuals seek patents beyond the lure of supracompetitive 
pricing.  
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I. Introduction 
Law students are taught to think of patents as the cold tools 
of business: mechanisms by which firms compete and control, 
attack and defend. The value of patents flows from the power they 
grant their owner to exclude others from making or using a new 
technology. The economic might of patents is at the heart of both 
great industrial battles that affect the fate of humankind1 and 
smaller disputes between a wide cast of players. All of the patent 
cases that law students read, and virtually all of the scholarly 
commentary of their professors, revolve around the right to exclude 
offered by patents.  
The conventional story of patents, the story that all students 
of patent law learn by heart, draws on a simple economic rationale. 
Patents provide a financial benefit: the ability to engage in 
supracompetitive pricing by excluding others from practicing the 
claimed technology.2 People are drawn to file for patents because 
that is how the economic rewards are secured.3 A large body of 
                                                                                                     
 1. See generally CHRISTOPHER BEAUCHAMP, INVENTED BY LAW: ALEXANDER 
GRAHAM BELL AND THE PATENT THAT CHANGED AMERICA (Harvard Univ. Press 
2015) (using the Bell patent claiming telephonic communication as an example). 
 2. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 295 (2003) (“One reason patent 
protection can be more valuable than copyright protection is that a patent 
protects against any duplication of the patented invention rather than merely 
forbidding the copying of it.”). 
 3. See, e.g., id. at 294 (“The conventional rationale for granting legal 
protection to inventions . . . is the difficulty that a producer may encounter in 
trying to recover his fixed costs of research and development when the product or 
process that embodies a new invention is readily copiable.”). 
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scholarship on patents and patent law has explored variations on 
this basic economic incentive to patent.4  
But the real story of why people seek patents is more complex, 
as scholars recognize.5 Clarissa Long, for example, explained that 
firms may patent as a form of economic signaling — to show others 
that they possess certain characteristics.6 More recently, Dan Burk 
drew on the “new institutional” school of sociology to argue that 
organizational patenting is driven to some extent by a narrative 
“as to what is socially acceptable or desirable,” rather than being a 
neo-classical rational response to an economic incentive.7 Surveys 
of businesses’ motivations for patenting indicate that reputation is 
a major driver, particularly among firms seeking to build their 
                                                                                                     
 4. See, e.g., Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and 
the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1255, 1261 (2009) (studying the competitive and economic incentives 
start-ups have for seeking patents); Robert P. Merges, Philosophical Foundations 
of IP Law: The Law and Economics Paradigm, in 1 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE 
ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Peter S. Menell et al. ed., 
forthcoming 2019) (describing how the utilitarian theory of intellectual property 
and using a cost-benefit analysis fits well with economics but noting alternative 
theories of intellectual property can also be understood from a law and economics 
perspective); Theresa Veer & Florian Jell, Contributing to Markets for 
Technology? A Comparison of Patent Filing Motives of Individual Inventors, 
Small Companies and Universities, 32 TECHNOVATION 513, 515 (2012) (studying 
the motivation of applicants to the European Patent office).  
 5. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, On the Sociology of Patenting, 101 MINN. L. REV. 
421, 442 (2016); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 627 (2002) 
(challenging the convention that a patent’s value only comes from exclusivity). 
 6. See Long, supra note 5, at 646 (explaining how investors may believe 
patents or research and development rates will correspond to future value of the 
company). 
 7. See Burk, supra note 5, at 442 (developing an alternate explanation for 
why individuals choose to seek a patent that fits two positions: on the one hand, 
inventors may seek patents because the credential is part of a social role; on the 
other, inventors may seek patents because patents increase future economic 
opportunities and provide self-validation).  
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identity and status.8 Some literature suggests that firms may 
patent as a way to reward their employees.9  
When it comes to the reasons why individuals—human 
beings — are driven to patent, however, the literature is sparser. 
There is unquestionably a generalized understanding that patents 
provide some form of reputational benefit, but the mechanism has 
proven elusive.10 In The Eureka Myth, Jessica Silbey emphasizes 
the importance of reputation to creators but concludes that patent 
law is misaligned with creators’ interest in reputation.11 Jeanne 
Fromer’s work observes that certain “expressive incentives” that 
recognize a creator’s moral rights can complement the usual 
utilitarian view of patents.12 She identifies attribution as one 
incentive that can promote inventorship; the unstated corollary is 
that inventors will seek patents to establish that attribution.13 In 
another recent article, Will Hubbard discusses “inventing norms,” 
                                                                                                     
 8. See generally Knut Blind et al., Motives to Patent: Empirical Evidence 
from Germany, 35 RES. POL’Y 655 (2006) (reviewing surveys examining small 
firms’ motivations to patent and conducting its own survey of those motivations 
in German); Graham et al., supra note 4, at 1264 (surveying high technology 
firms’ motivations for patenting); Veer & Jell, supra note 4, at 515 (reporting on 
data from the 2006 European Patent Office questionnaire).  
 9. See Blind, supra note 8, at 670 (“There is obviously a converging trend 
among sectors regarding the use of patents to motivate employees and to measure 
performance.”); Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It’s Due: The Law and Norms of 
Attribution, 95 GEO. L.J. 49, 54 (2006) (describing attribution systems in 
business). 
 10. See JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND 
EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 149 – 83 (Stanford Univ. Press 2015) (offering 
an example of the recognition of reputation as a driver for creators, as well as the 
slipperiness of that concept).  
 11. See id. at 149–53 (stating that within intellectual property law 
trademark is best suited to address reputation, while copyright and patent law 
are less pertinent to regulating reputation). 
 12. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 
VA. L. REV. 1745, 1747 (2012) (“The law’s careful use of expressive incentives can 
bolster the utilitarian inducement to create valuable intellectual property.”).  
 13. See id. at 1790 – 94 (explaining how and why a work’s attribution to its 
creator “can bolster an author’s or inventor’s reputation [and] concretize[] the 
personhood interest creators have in viewing their creations as strong 
components of their self-concept”); see also Stephanie Plamondon Bair, The 
Psychology of Patent Protection, 48 CONN. L. REV. 297, 320 (2015) (suggesting 
attribution is “a powerful motivator of knowledge sharing because of the promise 
of enhanced feelings of competency . . . that it offers”). 
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which he defines as the societal norms that promote invention.14 
His primary analysis focuses on what causes individuals to 
invent,15 but in the course of his analysis Hubbard refers to patents 
as credentials (much like a degree) that may be used to signal to 
friends and family that the inventor on the patent is worthy of 
respect.16 Similarly, in his opus on non-utilitarian rationales for 
intellectual property, Robert Merges alludes to the idea that 
intellectual property rights in general serve as some kind of 
credential to creators.17 He describes the rights as a type of reward 
for the bravery of releasing intellectual property to the world.18 
Merges also discusses the inventor’s pseudo moral right to be listed 
as an inventor.19 This idea of a “moral right to credit”20 has received 
support from several courts.21  
                                                                                                     
 14. See William Hubbard, Inventing Norms, 44 CONN. L. REV. 369, 373 (2011) 
(comparing social norms to inventing norms, “which are social attitudes of 
approval for successful invention”).  
 15. See id. at 369 (arguing that, in addition to economic motivations, 
“inventors are . . . motivated by social norms, that is, shared normative beliefs 
favoring certain actions while disfavoring others”).  
 16. See id. at 400 (“Patents are also important in professional circles, and 
patentees often treat issued patents as a credential-like a degree.”). Dan Burk’s 
concept of patents as “boundary objects” raises similar themes. See Dan L. Burk, 
Patent Silences, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1603, 1606 (2016) (defining boundary objects as 
“artifacts that have sufficiently definite meaning to be useful in disparate social 
worlds, but which simultaneously are sufficiently ambiguous to become objects of 
collaboration between such disparate social worlds”).  
 17. See ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 311 (2011) 
(“IP gives [creators] a reason to believe that some day, for some of them anyway, 
a real career could be made by doing what they are best at.”). 
 18. See id. at 310–11 (noting that “IP rights represent an important token of 
respect and recognition for those souls brave enough to launch their 
creations . . .”). 
 19. See id. at 158 (“The moral right to credit exists in patent law as well. An 
inventor has a right to have his name on a patent.”).  
 20. Id.  
 21. See Czarnik v. Illumina, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 252, 256 (D. Del. 2006) 
(concluding that the plaintiff had standing to correct inventorship because “he 
ha[d] suffered harm to his reputation and standing in the scientific community”); 
see also Chou v. Univ. of Chi., 254 F.3d 1347, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[B]eing 
considered an inventor of important subject matter is a mark of success in one’s 
field . . . . Pecuniary consequences may well flow from being designated as an 
inventor.”). 
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This Article adds to the existing literature by articulating a 
concrete theory and framework for understanding the relationship 
between patents and individuals that builds on Hubbard and 
Merges’s idea of patents functioning as credentials. This theory 
and framework is situated within the doctrinal structure of patent 
law, and the formal concept of patents as credentials has 
implications for patent law’s own future.  
We emphasize that the idea of “patents as credentials” is not 
merely a rhetorical substitute for the generalized understanding 
that patents provide a reputational benefit. This would not move 
the ball beyond what Silbey, Frommer, Hubbard, and Merges have 
already articulated. Instead, we argue that the real mechanism of 
patents’ reputational effect is not merely some generalized 
benefit—perhaps articulated through the rhetoric of 
“credential”— but rather the specific abstraction and formality of a 
patent. Put another way, it is precisely because of the artificiality 
of patents that they are able to function as a mechanism to enhance 
one’s reputation.22  
Just as this Article uses the formalized abstraction of 
credentials to understand the reputational effect of patents, so too 
do patents provide a formalized abstraction of the contributions 
and characteristics of a human being. In other words, we are using 
a social construct to analyze something that is itself a social 
construct.23 Viewed in these terms, the reason why this Article is 
titled “Patents as Credentials” rather than “Patents as 
Reputation” is because a central theme of this Article is that 
formalization matters — after all, formalization is why, as this 
Article intends to show, patents are such powerful mechanisms of 
reputation and self-fulfillment. The formal lens of credentials 
offers important insights into the non-exclusionary role of patents.  
                                                                                                     
 22. This, we think, is perhaps a way out of what Silbey perceives as a 
disconnect between intellectual property rights (or at least, patents) and 
reputation: while reputation may be too slippery to own, one can possess certain 
elements from which one’s reputation is formed. See SILBEY, supra note 10, at 181 
(“Reputation is hard to ‘own’ in the way that property (or IP) might be owned and 
defined.”).  
 23. Infra Part IV; see Fisk, supra note 9, at 1135 (“Patent law thus adopted 
the Romantic notion of the individual as the inventor or originator of an idea, and 
turned it into a legal category that supported a whole system of property rights, 
thus turning a legal category back into a social fact.”).  
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At its core, our explanation of the patent credential is simple: 
some human beings want to be recognized by society as inventors. 
But, claiming to be an inventor without evidence is unlikely to 
persuade the masses — or even, perhaps, friends. Patents serve as 
powerful evidence that an individual is an inventor.24 Just as a 
doctoral degree in history might indicate that one is a historian or 
an award from a community organization might be seen as a bona 
fide certification of one’s commitment to public interest, obtaining 
a patent shows that the person named on its face is a real-life, 
government-certified inventor.25 Regardless of whether a 
particular patent conveys an economically valuable measure of 
exclusion, the inventorship recognition alone may drive some 
individuals to seek patents. Intertwined with this formal 
recognition is the element of self-validation that patents provide.26 
In a way, obtaining a patent is similar to passing a test—a 
mechanism of external recognition of achievement that adds to 
one’s own identity.  
The power of patents as credentials is one that is based on the 
core attributes of patents themselves.  Perhaps most prominently, 
patents have powerful social recognition.27 They 
indicate — perhaps even define—the existence of an invention. The 
individual or individuals named as inventors on the patent are, 
ipso facto, inventors. Patents possess a deep-rooted, historical 
veracity. With a patent, one can draw upon the likes of Morse, 
Edison, and Bell. Legally, only a true inventor may receive a 
patent.28  
Beyond their social meaning, patents exhibit the attributes of 
a high-quality credential. They are issued by an entity that 
                                                                                                     
 24. See Hubbard, supra note 14, at 401 (arguing that one reason Thomas 
Edison is considered America’s most prolific inventor is because he was named an 
inventor on over 1,000 patents).  
 25.  See id. (explaining that patents help identify persons worthy of respect 
and esteem by communicating information regarding an invention’s attributes).  
 26. C.f. Bair, supra note 13, at 310 (explaining that the aims of personality 
theory, which is “primarily concerned with validating the personhood of creators 
through their works,” may be achieved by ensuring a creator receives credit for 
her work).  
 27. Infra Part IV.A.  
 28. Infra Part IV.B.2.a.  
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possesses substantial legitimacy.29 There is the informational 
content of the credential, provided through direct certification as 
well as signaling and filtering. And while the basic requirements 
to obtain a patent are simple enough for everyone to understand 
(even a child),30 the facts that satisfy these requirements are often 
quite complex and require a high level of substantive technical 
knowledge to understand and analyze under the legal 
requirements—hence the necessity for relying on the credential.31 
Whether the facts satisfy the requirements is a determination 
made by an Examiner employed by a central Patent Office.32 The 
Examiner assesses and measures whether each application really 
claims a new and fully disclosed invention—in other words, that 
the self-proclaimed inventor really is in possession of an invention. 
In this way, patents may be even better than a degree from a fancy 
institution: they bear the government’s own seal, proclaiming one 
to be a real inventor. A real red ribbon.33  
The value of this ribbon is more than just economic, although 
it can be that. As with a traditional academic credential, a patent 
may raise an individual in the eyes of an employer—an economic 
function that may be the individual version of Clarissa Long’s 
                                                                                                     
 29.  See Hubbard, supra note 14, at 399 (“Because a patent issues only after 
administrative examination, the patent indicates with at least modest credibility 
that [the] requirements for patentability have been met and thus identifies the 
patentee as the creator of a meaningful new invention.”).  
 30. Infra Part IV.B.2.a.  
 31.  See Hubbard, supra note 14, at 398 (describing the patent examiners as 
professionals “with experience and training in the technological field to which the 
invention relates”).  
 32.  See id. at 399 (describing the process by which inventors must convince 
patent examiners to grant their inventions).  
 33. Consider the red ribbons of Edward Bellamy’s influential nineteenth 
century novel Looking Backward. See ERNEST FREEBERG, THE AGE OF EDISON: 
ELECTRIC LIGHT AND THE INVENTION OF MODERN AMERICA 153 (2013) (quoting 
EDWARD BELLAMY, LOOKING BACKWARD, 2000 – 1887, at 226 (1888)) 
In the socialist utopia depicted in Edward Bellamy’s bestselling novel 
Looking Backward, 2000 – 1887, the nineteenth century time traveler 
found that inventive geniuses in the better world of the year 2000 
created new ideas simply for the chance to serve mankind, the reward 
of more time to pursue invention, and the dream of winning he society’s 
highest reward: the honor of sporting a red ribbon that marked the 
wearer as a great human benefactor.  
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Patent Signaling of firms.34 But patents can also have social 
caché—value beyond the purely monetary: the sweat on the palm 
of an interviewee as he sees the stack of black patent cubes behind 
the interviewer,35 the joy of knowing that your friend is an inventor 
of a patented technology, the warm glow that being recognized as 
contributing something new to society may bring.36 By serving as 
credentials, patents provide a measure of societal validation of an 
individual’s contribution, bolstering the recipient’s innate sense of 
self-worth.  
Examples of the use of patents as credentials abound 
throughout society and history.  We address patents’ appearance 
in academia, their use as rewards by employers, and their 
necessity for entry into honorary societies of inventors.37 
Ultimately, however, this Article can only scratch the surface of 
these examples. It suggests, however, that further research on the 
credentialing function of patents—particularly, empirical 
research38—is called for. 
Some of the normative implications of the credentialing 
function of patents are clear. For one, if society correctly values 
practical innovation as a social good—an assumption we are 
willing to make—then the credentialing function of patents aligns 
fairly well with recognizing inventors for contributing to that social 
good. It is not perfect, but given the relative rigor of the 
examination process, the height of the bar to achieve the 
credential, and the identity of the issuer, it is probably better than 
many other credentials at providing evidence for the characteristic 
for which it stands. Patent credentials may also serve a valuable 
function by identifying individuals with inventive abilities, thus 
providing information that will be useful to future employers or 
business partners.39  
                                                                                                     
 34. See generally Long, supra note 5.  
 35. See KEITH CURTIS, AFTER THE SOFTWARE WARS 92 (2016) (recalling the 
author’s interview for a new position within Microsoft and the tinge of jealousy 
he felt at seeing his interviewer’s patents on display in his office). 
 36. See generally ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (1759) 
(describing the human desire for approbation). 
 37. Infra Part V. 
 38. Infra Part V.E. 
 39. See Hubbard, supra note 14, at 401 (“[P]atents . . . thereby help identify 
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That said, there is a dark side of credentials, one that patents 
are hardly immune to. We acknowledge, as we must, that patent 
law is not perfect, that overreliance on credentials is problematic, 
and misunderstanding of the meaning of a patent can lead to ruin 
for the inventor.40 Perhaps even more concerning is that 
patents — as with other types of credentials—can be mechanisms 
that preserve existing castes and restrict opportunities for those 
who lack access to them. The history of patents shows that this 
criticism has merit, although the story is more complex than a 
simple power hierarchy. This may be precisely because of the 
formalized nature of patents—in other words, their function as 
credentials. 
Our normative assessment leads into our final conclusion, one 
for those who crave a legal payoff from the theory of patents as 
credentials. If we as a society think that patents do serve a 
valuable role as credentials—or at least, that their benefits as 
signals outweigh the costs of credentialism—then we should take 
that concern into account when evaluating changes to the patent 
law. Particularly, recent changes to patent law have shifted 
patents further toward being stark tools of business.41 Those 
changes, we suggest, might make sense on one level, but they fail 
to take into account the effect of altering these symbols’ meanings 
to human beings.  
This Article proceeds as follows. We begin by describing the 
formal construct of a credential in Part II. Part III explains the 
legal aspects of patents, including their substantive and 
procedural components. Our central thesis that patents should be 
understood as credentialsformal abstractions of a person’s 
inventive natureis argued in Part IV. Part V provides examples 
of patents serving as credentials across a wide landscape of society. 
Finally, in Part VI, we assess the idea of patents as credentials 
from a normative perspective. We close in Part VII with some 
thoughts on the implications of viewing patents as credentials. 
                                                                                                     
persons worthy of respect and esteem pursuant to inventing norms.”).  
 40. Infra Part VI.  
 41. Infra Part VII. 
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II. What is a Credential? 
This calls for emergency action! That man is a spellbinder. 
I want his credentials.42  
—Mayor Shinn 
A credential is a formalized indicator that a person possesses 
a particular, otherwise difficult to observe attribute.43 A credential 
is typically embodied as a literal document or certificate that 
provides evidence of a person’s identity or qualifications, although 
the concept of a credential is not limited to its physical 
incarnation.44 A credential provides a mechanism by which 
uncertainties and issues of trust between parties can be reduced.45 
“Credentialing seeks to mediate between parties by enabling 
trusting relationships where doubt, uncertainty, or risk exists.”46 
The use of credentials “arises where, for any of a variety of 
structural reasons, a party cannot easily judge for itself on the 
                                                                                                     
 42. MEREDITH WILLSON, THE MUSIC MAN sc. 5. Tangential to the main plot of 
The Music Man is the mayor and school board’s quest to obtain “Professor” Harold 
Hill’s credentials. Id. They are so focused on the credentials that Hill is forced to 
resort to an array of shenanigans to distract them. Id. 
 43. See David K. Brown, The Social Sources of Educational Credentialism: 
Status Cultures, Labor Markets, and Organizations, 74 SOC. EDUC. (EXTRA ISSUE) 
19, 26 – 27 (2001) (discussing credentials as “formal rules” in labor market 
recruitment). 
 44. See, e.g., Credential, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH (Catherine 
Soanes & Angus Stevenson eds., 2d ed. 2003) (“A qualification, achievement, 
quality, or aspect of a person’s background, especially when used to indicate their 
suitability for something . . . .”); Credential, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED (Phillip 
Babcock Gove ed., 1971) (“[S]omething that gives a title to credit or confidence.”); 
Tony Buon & Bob Compton, Credentials, Credentialism and Employee Selection, 
28 ASIA PAC. J. HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 126, 126 (1990) (“Literally, credentials are 
letters or certificates that establish the position, authority or identity of the 
bearer.”); see also David K. Brown, Credentialing, in THE BLACKWELL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIOLOGY 1 (George Ritzer ed., 2016) (“Credentialing is at once 
a social relationship, a cultural system, and a historical process that entails 
assurances from a third party that another party in a two-party relationship 
possesses desirable qualities such as knowledge, technical competence, moral 
character, and legitimate authority.”). 
 45. See Brown, supra note 43, at 26 (“Degree holders thus hold power over 
nondegree [sic] holders on the basis of a formal claim to competence or 
untrustworthiness.”).  
 46. Brown, supra note 44.  
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substantive uncertainties attendant upon social transactions.”47 
To put it another way, “[credentials] are tokens of trust used to 
vouch that people are who they say they are, and have the qualities 
they claim to have.”48 
Credentials thus stand for a particular characteristic 
possessed by an individual. They are “a formal abstraction from 
substantive matters that claims to be a legitimate representation 
of some substantive reality, such that one party can trust the 
credential to be good enough to stand for a substantive scrutiny of 
whatever the credential represents.”49 For example, credentials 
can indicate what amount and type of education an individual has 
completed.50 But credentials are hardly limited to education.51 
They can be understood in broader terms as “abstractions that 
stand above the substance of various lived experiences”52 or as 
“means by which social actors can send and receive information 
under conditions of social uncertainty and anonymity.”53 
                                                                                                     
 47. Id. 
 48. SHERYL L. GRANT, WHAT COUNTS AS LEARNING: OPEN DIGITAL BADGES FOR 
NEW OPPORTUNITIES 10 (2014), https://dmlhub.net/wp-
content/uploads/files/WhatCountsAsLearning_Grant.pdf.  
 49. Brown, supra note 44; see also DAVID B. BILLS, THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
EDUCATION AND WORK 76 (2004) (explaining that employers rely on credentials 
because they are “a cheap, easily observed, and socially acceptable signal that 
employers can use when they have little other information”); David P. Baker, 
Forward and Backward, Horizontal and Vertical: Transformation of 
Occupational Credentialing in the Schooled Society, 29 RES. SOC. STRATIFICATION 
& MOBILITY 5, 6 (2011) (arguing that “educational degrees are fast becoming 
universally synonymous with human capacity in the occupational structure”); 
David K. Brown & David B. Bills, An Overture for the Sociology of Credentialing: 
Empirical, Theoretical, and Moral Considerations, 29 RES. SOC. STRATIFICATION 
& MOBILITY 133, 135 (2011) (“Credentials are sources of power for individual 
holders insofar as they effectively block substantive judgments about their actual 
abilities.”). 
 50. See Brown, supra note 44; BILLS, supra note 49, at 36 (noting that 
“Americans believe that education and work are intimately related, and that this 
is how it should be”).  
 51.  See Brown & Bills, supra note 49, at 134 (“Memberships in various forms 
of consumption groups undoubtedly provide credentialing powers analogous to 
educational degrees.”).  
 52. Id.  
 53. BILLS, supra note 49, at 59; see also Baker, supra note 49, at 5–6 
(proposing that “education as an institution provides the logic by which 
educational credentialing becomes evermore legitimate, more so than from forces 
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Credentials might also be analogized to data compression, the 
process of reducing the size of a signal or other information source 
while still conveying information.54 Just as a novel might be 
distilled to just its plot, characters and symbols, so too can a 
credential compress a multi-year experience into a diploma. In 
short, credentials are a mechanism of information transfer that 
distills complex, often difficult to observe information into a 
portable, translatable indicator.55  
Credentials fulfill this information communication function in 
multiple ways. Perhaps the strongest way is through their role as 
symbols, full of the meaning society attaches to them.56 A 
credential abstracts an experience, characteristic or set of skills 
and knowledge into a more symbolic form with its own socially 
constructed meaning.57 For example, “[d]egrees direct people to 
accept an abstraction (the symbolic, cultural embodiment of the 
degree itself) as a representation of something else (substantive 
knowledge, skill, or loyalty).”58  
Beyond the meaning that society ascribes to the credential, 
credentials communicate information in and of themselves. For 
one thing, a credential communicates certain pieces of information 
directly to its audience.59 A particular degree, for example, 
                                                                                                     
outside the institution itself such as the economy and labor market demand”); 
Brown, supra note 44; Sheryl Grant, Building Collective Belief in Badges: 
Designing Trust Networks, in FOUNDATION OF DIGITAL BADGES AND 
MICRO-CREDENTIALS 97, 103 (Dirk Ifenthaler, et al. eds., 2016). See generally 
STEVEN L. NOCK, THE COSTS OF PRIVACY: SURVEILLANCE AND REPUTATION IN 
AMERICA (Michael Useem & James D. Wright eds., 1993).  
 54. See, e.g., DAVID SALOMON, A CONCISE INTRODUCTION TO DATA 
COMPRESSION 5 (2008).  
 55.  See, e.g., Baker, supra note 49, at 12 (“[E]ducational degrees . . . emerge 
as indicators of development of the individual with widely assumed repercussions 
for all aspects of the person . . . .”).  
 56.  See Brown, supra note 43, at 26 (discussing Weber’s argument that 
credentials are a form of social credit that symbolically facilitate exchanges under 
conditions of social uncertainty).  
 57.  See id. (discussing credentials in the context of education and arguing 
that credentials abstract qualities that are held to persist over time).  
 58. Id.  
 59. See Hubbard, supra note 14, at 400 (offering patents as an example of a 
credential that communicates information even to non-technical audiences who 
nevertheless understand the significance of the simple fact that a patent has been 
granted).  
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indicates that the degree recipient has met the requirements of 
that degree: she has taken certain classes and met prescribed 
minimum standards.60 A credential can also serve a screening 
function—in other words, to sort out individuals of differing 
abilities, thereby conveying information to the purchasers of 
labor.61 As described by Kenneth Arrow, the function of higher 
education is not to contribute to cognition or socialization, but 
rather to filter out those who will produce the greatest economic 
productivity.62 Credentials can also function as economic signals or 
communications about unobservable characteristics that are less 
costly for desirable individuals to provide than for others.63 That 
is, if obtaining an education is less costly for “good” employees than 
for “bad” employees, investment in obtaining an education is a 
potential signal that an employer may use to distinguish the good 
prospective employees from the bad.64 
One way to think about the information function of credentials 
is to set it against the backdrop of what sociologist David Bills 
describes as the “meritocracy” and “credentialism” models of 
                                                                                                     
 60. For example, the American Bar Association requires that graduates from 
accredited law schools complete a minimum set of required classes. See ABA 
STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 16 (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2017) (requiring a course in professional responsibility, two courses with a 
substantial writing component, and a sizeable experiential learning experience). 
Beyond the minimum requirements, each accredited law school sets its own 
standards for receiving a J.D. See, e.g., UNIV. OF IOWA COLL. OF LAW, ACADEMIC 
REQUIREMENTS OVERVIEW 1–2 (2013), https://law.uiowa.edu/sites/law. 
uiowa.edu/files/curriculum_overview_0.pdf (setting out the school’s academic 
requirements); Degree Requirements, UNIV. KAN. SCH. L., 
https://law.ku.edu/requiredcourses (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (same) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); J.D. Degree Requirements, YALE L. SCH., 
https://law.yale.edu/study-law-yale/degree-programs/jd-program/jd-degree-
requirements (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (same) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
 61. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Higher Education as a Filter, 2 J. PUB. ECON. 193, 
194 (1973) (arguing that “higher education serves as a screening device, in that it 
sorts out individuals of differing abilities”). 
 62. See id.  
 63. Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECONOMICS 355, 358 
(1973). 
 64. See id. (“It is not difficult to see that a signal will not effectively 
distinguish one applicant from another, unless the costs of signaling are 
negatively correlated with productive capability.”).  
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education and work.65 In the meritocracy model, employers desire 
employees with certain attributes such as knowledge, skill, and 
work ethic.66 Credentials function as strong evidence that an 
individual possesses the attributes tied to obtaining the 
credential.67 Good credentials thus provide a high signal-to-noise 
ratio.68 On the other hand, in the “credentialism” model, 
credentials are simply arbitrarily handed out and bear little actual 
relationship to those attributes necessary to perform a job 
successfully — or at all.69 Credentials thus bear a low (or zero) 
signal-to-noise ratio; indeed, there may be little informational 
value of the credentials at all.70  
Credentials exist on more than a purely economic level, 
however.71 As sociologist David Brown observes, “[c]redentialing is 
at once a social relationship, a cultural system, and a historical 
process that entails assurances from a third party that another 
party in a two-party relationship possesses desirable qualities such 
as knowledge, technical competence, moral character, and 
legitimate authority.”72 Much of the contemporary research on 
                                                                                                     
 65. BILLS, supra note 49, at 37–60. 
 66. Id. at 41–44. Note that none of these characteristics need be 
conceptualized narrowly. “Skill,” for example, could include such attributes as an 
ability to write clearly, analyze problems rigorously, or function as part of an 
interdisciplinary team.  
 67. See id. at 59–60 (discussing Steven Nock’s theory of the relationship 
between surveillance and reputation, which suggests that “education credentials 
provide a reason to have confidence in the ability and reliability of strangers”).  
 68.  See C.E. Shannon, A Mathematical Theory of Communication, 27 BELL 
SYS. TECHNICAL J. 379, 381 (1948) (arguing that the maximum amount of 
information that can reliably be carried through a signal is limited by the amount 
of noise in the channel).  
 69. See BILLS, supra note 49, at 47–55 (suggesting that one way to think 
about credentialism is as a “sheepskin effect,” which is defined as a 
“disproportionately large increase[] in returns to schooling after the completion of 
certain years that usually entail[s] a degree”).  
 70. See Buon & Compton, supra note 44, at 130 – 31 (arguing that criteria 
such as behavior, skill, knowledge, and attitude are far better indicators of future 
job performance than credentials, “which may have some limited relevance to the 
job”).  
 71.  See Brown, supra note 44, at 1.  
 72. Id. 
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credentialing seeks to understand the concept within the broader 
context of economic, social, and cultural themes.73 
Unfortunately, the sociological literature provides relatively 
little description of what makes a credential a good source of 
information. Some of this thinness may be due to the underlying 
disagreement over the value of education itself—specifically, 
whether it increases productivity or not.74 The credentialing 
literature also tends to focus on the dark underside of credentials, 
looking for worms under the stone rather than trying to figure out 
why the stone was so heavy and hard to move in the first place.75  
Although there seems to be no one accepted definition of what 
distinguishes a high-quality credential from one that is not, the 
literature does offer a few hints. One aspect of the informational 
value of a credential lies in the legitimacy of the issuer.76 The 
greater the perceived legitimacy of the issuer to the audience, the 
greater the value of the credential.77 A degree from Harvard may 
have carried great weight among Boston employers in the 1930s; 
it carried much less weight among farmers in the dustbowl.78 The 
greater the perceived legitimacy of the issuer—and the broader 
that perception—the higher the value of the credential.79 
A second aspect lies in the ability of the audience to 
understand what the credential stands for—in other words, to 
comprehend the meaning of the credential, both in terms of its 
substantive requirements and as an abstraction.80 What is the 
attribute that it is standing for, or the experience that one has 
                                                                                                     
 73. See id.  
 74. See id. at 2. 
 75. Infra Part VI.  
 76. See BILLS, supra note 49, at 49 – 50 (discussing the differences between 
credentials issued via accreditation, certification, and licensing). 
 77. See id. at 50 (noting that licensing is the most restrictive form of 
occupation regulation and that licenses are therefore some of the most valuable 
credentials).  
 78. See JONATHAN RABAN, BAD LAND: AN AMERICAN ROMANCE 217 – 40 (1996) 
(describing the plight of homesteaders during the “Dirty Thirties”). 
 79.  See BILLS, supra note 65, at 50 (explaining that licenses are considered 
more valuable than certificates because licensing is a more restrictive form of 
occupational regulation than certification). 
 80. See Brown & Bills, supra note 49, at 134 (explaining the abstractions 
associated with credentials are created for various social purposes).  
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undergone?81 For a credential to function, the observers of the 
credential—the recipients of the information—must recognize it as 
meaning something.82 Some credentials, such as a high school 
diploma, may have a widely accepted meaning; others, such as 
digital badges, may only have meaning to certain communities.83  
A third aspect of the value of a credential lies in the audience’s 
need to rely on the credential rather than direct observation of the 
attribute or experience.84 After all, if the audience can directly 
observe the relevant characteristic, behavior, or experience, it has 
no need for a credential.85  
In summary, the interrelationship of three aspects allows 
credentials to enable trusting relationships where uncertainty 
would otherwise exist: (1) the ability of the credential to abstract 
                                                                                                     
 81. See id. (“Cultural meanings make differences that matter. Credentials 
may connote different meanings to social actors of all sorts.”). David Salomon 
explains:  
The key to compressing data is the distinction between data and 
information. Data is how information is represented; it is the physical 
embodiment of the information. We know that it is possible to use 
different amounts of data to convey the same information. A good 
example is a story. A novel that originally occupies 300 pages can be 
“digested” and compressed to just 30 pages without losing the main 
outlines of the plot. The same story may be told by one person in 2000 
words and by another in 200 words because the former employs 
unnecessary (or irrelevant) words, thus introducing redundancy into 
his narrative, while the latter selects only those words that are strictly 
needed.  
SALOMON, supra note 54, at 5. Of course, information is necessarily lost during 
this process. For example, while it may be possible to summarize the plot, 
characters, and symbols of George Orwell’s 1984 in a much shorter pamphlet, one 
might argue that much of its communicative content is lost in that compression. 
See generally GILBERT BORMAN & FRANK H. THOMPSON JR., CLIFFSNOTES ON 
ORWELL’S 1984 (1st ed. 1967) (presenting an abridged version of George Orwell’s 
1984 in pamphlet format).  
 82. See Grant, supra note 53, at 97–114.  
 83. See id. 
 84. See id.; Brown, supra note 44 (“Credential use arises where, for any of a 
variety of structural reasons, a party cannot easily judge for itself on the 
substantive uncertainties attendant upon social transactions.”); Brown, supra 
note 43, at 26 (“Credentials abstract qualities that are held to persist over time, 
so that substantive inquiry about the retention of knowledge can also be set 
aside.”).  
 85. See NOCK, supra note 53, at 43–44 (arguing that society relies on 
reputations to justify trust). 
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or compress information about a characteristic or experience, 
(2) the need of the audience to rely on a credential rather than 
direct observation of that characteristic or experience, and (3) the 
legitimacy of the issuer in determining whether that credential is 
deserved.  
These three criteria, together with the broader social meaning 
of patents, provide the analytical framework for our examination 
of patents as credentials.  
III. Patents and Their Requirements 
The basic concept of a patent is likely familiar to any modern 
reader. In simplest terms, a patent is a set of exclusive rights 
granted to an inventor in return for publicly disclosing an 
invention.86 Patent rights are created by the law of individual 
nations.87 Although treaties exist that harmonize the basic 
requirements to obtain a patent, there is no “worldwide patent.”88 
In the United States, the authority to issue patents is established 
by the federal Constitution.89 It grants Congress the power “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”90  
                                                                                                     
 86. See, e.g., DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS OV-2 (2010) (“A patent 
confers the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the claimed 
invention in the United States for a term of 17 years from the issue date.”).  
 87. See id. (explaining how the Constitution empowered Congress to 
establish a national patent system in the United States).  
 88. For example, an inventor may obtain a patent in the United States, a 
patent in Canada, and a patent in Brazil. While there is a near-universal 
application mechanism called a PCT application, and several treaties that 
harmonize the substantive law of the member states, there is no serious current 
move toward creating a worldwide patent. See Katrina McClatchey, The 
European Patent Office and the European Patent: An Open Avenue for 
Biotechnologists and “Living Inventions”, 2 OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 25, 25 (2004) (“[A] 
patent only offers protection within the territorial boundaries of the country that 
grants the inventor the patent. In other words, there is no such thing as a 
‘worldwide’ patent. Therefore, an inventor must file for and obtain a patent in 
each country where protection is desired.”).  
 89.  U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 90. Id. 
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Much has been written about the history of the patent system: 
how it came to be, how it evolved and changed over the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, and how patent law changed during that 
time.91 Suffice it to say that patents in the United States are as old 
as the nation.92 The first patent law was passed on April 10, 1790;93 
the first patent issued three months later.94 For most of their 
existence, U.S. patents have been examined and issued by a Patent 
Office, an agency of the federal government.95 While the look of 
patents has changed over the past two centuries, the core idea — an 
exclusive right to an invention granted in exchange for revealing 
how to make and use that invention—has remained the same.96 
Today, patents are issued by the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office, an agency of the Department of Commerce.97 
Each has historically come bearing a gold seal and red ribbon, and 
                                                                                                     
 91. See generally BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1 (examining the legal battles 
surrounding Alexander Graham Bell’s telephone patent); KENNETH W. DOBYNS, 
THE PATENT OFFICE PONY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY PATENT OFFICE (1994) 
(describing the patent system to the end of the nineteenth century); B. ZORINA 
KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION: PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS IN 
AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1790–1920 (2005) (explaining that, 
historically, the democratic market-orientation of the United States has ensured 
that patent institutions were calibrated to accommodate changes affecting private 
and social costs and benefits). For numerous secondary historical sources on 
patents, patent law, and the patent system, see BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 
215 – 60.  
 92.  See CHISUM, supra note 86, at OV-3 (noting that Congress enacted the 
first patent statute in 1790).  
 93. Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 (repealed 1793). 
 94. U.S. Patent No. X00001 (issued July 31, 1790). 
 95. Technically, modern patents are issued by the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office. As this Article is focused on the patent side of things, for 
stylistic reasons “Patent Office” is used.  
 96. See CHISUM, supra note 86, at OV-3 (explaining that the 1790 and 1793 
patent statutes introduced the fundamental concepts, such as “useful art” and 
“new and useful improvement thereon,” that remain features of United States 
patent law today).  
 97. See About Us, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/about-us (last visited 
February 19, 2019) (“The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
is the federal agency for granting U.S. patents and registering trademarks.”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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is signed by the Director of the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office.98 
 
Figure 1: Pre-2018 Cover of a patent.99 
 
                                                                                                     
 98. See, e.g., Janet E. Reed, Publishing and Patenting the Fruits of Academic 
Research: The Key to a Successful Parallel Track, 14 NATURE IMMUNOLOGY 523, 
524 (2013) (providing an image of the cover of a patent).  In 2018, the USPTO 
released a new version of the patent cover: the ribbon is gone but the seal remains.  
See USPTO Unveils New Patent Cover Design at South by Southwest (SXSW), 
USPTO (MAR. 11, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/uspto-
unveils-new-patent-cover-design-south-southwest-sxsw (last visited Feb. 19, 
2019) (“This new design portrays a modern day flair while reflecting the history 
of patent covers by taking design cues from 19th and early 20th century patent 
cover designs, mostly through the use of script typography and graphic 
ornaments.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 99. Image of Cover of a Patent, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:US_Patent_cover.jpg (last visited Feb. 
19, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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The following Parts briefly describe the substantive criteria 
and process for obtaining a patent. While we recognize that most 
members of society at large—the receivers of the 
credential — might not know the patent system at this level of 
detail, we nonetheless think it is important to describe these 
criteria so as to weigh the normative value of patents as 
credentials later on. In other words, if the process is not any good, 
then we should be skeptical of the credential; if the process seems 
sound, the credential’s value is more legitimate.100 
A. The Criteria for Obtaining a Patent 
1. The Invention 
Beginning with the first Patent Act in 1790,101 Congress drew 
on its Constitutional power to authorize the issuance of patents 
provided that the application met substantive criteria set out by 
statute.102 Over time, the statutory requirements for obtaining a 
patent have evolved, but the core criteria—appropriate subject 
matter, usefulness, newness, and adequacy of disclosure—have 
remained the same.103 
The threshold question of what subject matter is eligible for a 
patent is a surprisingly opaque topic, at least at the legal margins. 
Indeed, if one were to ask a dozen people on the street about what 
kind of “stuff” is eligible for a patent, one would likely get a more 
definite perspective than the legal meaning of “patent eligible 
subject matter.” Courts and commentators have vigorously 
                                                                                                     
 100. Infra Part II. 
 101. Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 (repealed 1793). 
 102. See id. (requiring submission of a writing that distinguishes the 
invention from prior inventions and enables the public to understand the 
mechanics behind the invention).  
 103. Compare id. (“[G]rantee . . . of each patent shall . . . deliver . . . a 
specification in writing . . . which specification shall be so particular . . . as not 
only to distinguish the invention . . . but also to enable [another] . . . to 
make . . . the same . . . that the public may have the full benefit . . . after the 
expiration of the patent term . . . .”), with 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (“Whoever 
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a 
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”). 
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debated the boundaries of patentable subject matter in recent 
years and a framework for analyzing disputes is slowly beginning 
to emerge.104 Historically, however, five broadly defined categories 
have long stood as the “types” of subject matter that are 
appropriate for patents: machines, manufactures, compositions of 
matter, processes and improvements thereto.105 We can loosely 
refer to these as “inventions,” subject to the additional 
requirements below. 
To be patentable, an invention must be new.106 “New” means 
that an invention must be both novel, that is, not previously 
disclosed or placed on sale,107 and nonobvious, that is, a patent may 
not be obtained “if the differences between the claimed invention 
and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole 
would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the 
claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to 
                                                                                                     
 104. See, e.g., Ted G. Dane, Are the Federal Circuit’s Recent Section 101 
Decisions a “Specific Improvement” in Patent Eligibility Law, 26 FED. CIR. B.J. 
331, 375 – 77 (describing the post-Alice landscape of Federal Circuit jurisprudence 
and proposing possible improvements). 
 105. See ROBERT C. FABER, FABER ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING 
§ 1 – 4 (6th ed., 2013) (describing the classes of inventions that may be patented 
and summarizing recent developments regarding eligible subject matter under 35 
U.S.C. § 101). 
 106. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).  
 107. See id. (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . the claimed 
invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on 
sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the 
claimed invention.”). Until recently, patent law operated under a system whereby 
prior invention by another could defeat an inventor’s claim to a patent. See Lee 
Petherbridge & Jason Rantanen, Jay P. Kesan, Debate, America Invents, More or 
Less?, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 229, 230 (2012) (“For over two hundred 
years, American patent law has given priority of right to those who were first in 
time to an invention.”). The 2011 America Invents Act changed the framework 
from a “first to invent” system to a “first to file” system. See id. at 230 –  31 (“The 
best empirical study, which analyzed similar changes in the Canadian patent 
system and enjoys considerable theoretical support, indicates that such a change 
may discourage small inventors from inventing and innovating.” (citing David S. 
Abrams & R. Polk Wagner, Priority Rules: An Empirical Exploration of 
First-to-Invent Versus First-to-File (Univ. of Pa., Inst. for Law & Econ. Research 
Paper No. 11-29, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1883821)). Despite the change, 
a patent may still only be awarded for an invention that has not previously been 
disclosed. See id. at 246 (“The AIA-imposed system is not a first-to-file system like 
that used in other parts of the world. It is more technically a first-to-file or 
first-to-publicly-disclose system.”).  
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which the claimed invention pertains.”108 In most cases, novelty or 
nonobviousness is at issue.109  
A patentable invention must also be “useful.”110 Court 
decisions discuss how a proffered invention must be both 
“operable” and possess “practical” or “real world” utility, which is 
sometimes defined as meaning a “specific and substantial 
utility.”111 In two areas—biotechnology and chemical 
compounds — practical utility is taken quite seriously.112 Outside 
those two areas, however, the usefulness requirement is more of a 
threshold consideration than a significant barrier to 
patentability.113 Notably, “practical” utility under current doctrine 
can be purely communicative.114  
The final requirement of patentability is that of sufficient 
disclosure.115 The patent’s disclosure serves two purposes. First, it 
                                                                                                     
 108. 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
 109. See CHISUM, supra note 86, § 5.07 (summarizing decisions involving 
nonobviousness); accord Jason Rantanen, The Federal Circuit’s New Obviousness 
Jurisprudence: An Empirical Study, 15 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 709, 729 – 30 (2013) 
(finding 389 judicial opinions of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals that involved 
nonobviousness determinations in the ten years before the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in KSR v. Teleflex and the five years after its decision). 
 110. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 112.  
 111. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“An asserted use 
must show that the claimed invention has a significant and presently available 
benefit to the public” and “must also show that that claimed invention can be used 
to provide a well-defined and particular benefit to the public.”).  
 112. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND 
POLICY 223 – 54 (7th ed. 2017) (discussing utility in the biotechnology and chemical 
context); MUELLER, supra note 110, at 235 (“The utility disputes that do arise tend 
to involve inventions in the chemical and biotechnological arts.”). 
 113. See MUELLER, supra note 110, at 235 (“In contrast with the novelty and 
nonobviousness requirements . . . the substantive threshold for satisfying the 
utility requirement is relatively low.”). 
 114. An example offered in Janice Mueller’s influential patent law handbook 
is that of a patent for a “Hat Simulating a Fried Egg,” useful “as an 
attention-getting item in connection with promotional activities at trade shows, 
conventions and the like.” Id. at 236– 38 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,457,821). 
Mueller further observes that “[t]his is more than sufficient to satisfy the utility 
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101.” Id. at 238.  
 115. See Jason Rantanen, Patent Law’s Disclosure Requirement, 45 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 369, 370 (2013) (“Whether it be through doctrinal mechanisms such as 
enablement or written description, or through other articulations, providing 
information about the invention in the patent document itself is a foundational 
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allows the public to learn about the invention, to replicate it, to 
improve on it, and to avoid granting future patents on it.116 Second, 
it limits the maximum scope of patent claims by tethering the 
inventor to what was actually disclosed at the time of the 
application.117 In other words, for purposes of patent law, an 
inventor is treated as if she invented only what is disclosed in the 
patent document itself.118 While patent law allows the exclusive 
right of a patent to extend to some degree beyond what is disclosed, 
the disclosure provides an anchor for the inventor’s claim.119  
2. The Inventor 
In addition to disclosing an invention, every patent must name 
the inventor or inventors.120 While firms often file for patents on 
                                                                                                     
component of a patent system, a basic axis of patentability.”). 
 116. See id. at 373 (using the example of an inventor’s four-legged chair to 
explain that “a robust disclosure requirement would allow others not just to 
reproduce the applicant’s four-legged chair, but perhaps to develop three-legged 
chairs, or chairs that fold, or chairs with little writing surfaces attached to them”).  
 117. See Jason Rantanen, The Malleability of Patent Rights, 2015 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 895, 924 (describing the disclosure requirement as the “main patent law 
mechanism that ties the underlying invention to the scope of exclusive rights”). 
 118.  See id. at 927 (“Simply put, there is no doctrine in patent law that tightly 
limits the inventor’s rights to precisely what she disclosed; at best, there is a 
bungee cord. One must still stay within the ballpark of the technology, but where 
in the ballpark tends to be the important question.”). 
 119. See id. at 926 (explaining that “the point is that the law on enablement 
and written description permits claiming beyond what is contained in the patent’s 
technological disclosure”).  
 120. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (stating that “[w]hoever invents or 
discovers . . . may obtain a patent therefor”); id. § 111 (“An application for patent 
shall be made, or authorized to be made, by the inventor, except as otherwise 
provided in this title, in writing to the Director.”); id. § 115 (“An application for 
patent that is filed under section 111(a) or commences the national stage under 
section 371 shall include, or be amended to include, the name of the inventor for 
any invention claimed in the application.”). Prior to the 2011 America Invents 
Act, the inventorship requirement was also codified at § 102(f). 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) 
(2008) (“[A] person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . he did not himself 
invent the subject matter sought to be patented.”); see also Dennis Crouch, With 
102(f) Eliminated, Is Inventorship Now Codified in 35 U.S.C. 101? Maybe, but Not 
Restrictions on Patenting Obvious Variants of Derived Information, PATENTLYO 
(Oct. 4, 2012), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/10/with-102f-eliminated-is-
inventorship-now-codified-in-35-usc-101.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) 
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behalf of their employees, and may have legal title to the patent, 
only individuals — human beings — may be named as inventors.121  
The identity of the inventors named on a patent is a 
determination of law.122 Although, as with any legal question, the 
facts matter.123 A key element of the analysis is what the invention 
is; the answer, as with many parts of patent law, is the claims. One 
treatise on patent drafting explains: “The starting point for 
determining inventorship is to define the invention. Until it has 
been determined what is to be claimed and how that distinguishes 
over the prior art, it may not be possible to actually identify the 
inventors.”124  
Inventorship turns on who the invention originated 
with — that is, who “conceived” of the invention.125 Only a person 
                                                                                                     
(explaining the various views regarding the “real ongoing questions that stem 
from the elimination of section 102(f)”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). Note that a patent may be assigned or licensed—ownership is a separate 
issue from inventorship. 35 U.S.C. § 261. 
 121. 35 U.S.C. § 100 defines an inventor as “the individual or, if a joint 
invention, the individuals collectively who invented or discovered the subject 
matter of the invention.” The common legal meaning of “individual” is “a private 
or natural person as distinguished from a partnership, corporation, or 
association.” Individual, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). See also Ryan 
Abbott, I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the Future of Patent 
Law, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1079, 1092 – 93 (2016) (discussing the legal requirements of 
an invention). Historically, only human beings have been named as inventors on 
patents in the United States. See ALAN J. KASPER ET AL., PATENTS AFTER THE AIA: 
EVOLVING LAW AND PRACTICE, 7-7 to 7-9, 7-13 (discussing the requirement that a 
human being be listed as an inventor even though in practice the patent may be 
assigned to a business entity); see also Univ. of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft 
zu Forderung der Wissenschaften E.V., 734 F.3d 1315, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“To 
perform this mental act, inventors must be natural persons and cannot be 
corporations or sovereigns.”).  
 122. See, e.g., Nartron Corp. v. Schukra U.S.A., Inc., 558 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009) (stating that “[i]nventorship is a question of law, which we review 
without deference”). 
 123. See id. (observing also that “a party alleging non-joinder [on the patent] 
‘must meet the heavy burden of proving its case by clear and convincing evidence’” 
(quoting Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
 124. JEFFREY G. SHELDON, HOW TO WRITE A PATENT APPLICATION § 4:3 (2d ed. 
2014). 
 125. See Univ. of Utah, 734 F.3d at 1323 (“It is axiomatic that inventors are 
the individuals that conceive of the invention: ‘Conception is the touchstone of 
inventorship . . . ’” (quoting Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 
1223, 1227 – 28 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 
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who has contributed to the conception of the claimed invention 
may be named as an inventor.126 “Conception,” in turn, refers to 
the mental aspect of the inventing process— “the formation in the 
mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of the 
complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied 
in practice.”127 In other words, merely thinking of a general idea is 
not enough.  
Although there are sometimes hard questions in patent law 
when it comes to the identity of joint inventors, patent law 
theoretically allows for little flexibility in their identification.128 
The general rule is that each named inventor must have 
contributed to the conception of the invention, as defined by the 
claims, and all those who participated in the conception of the 
invention must be named.129 While that contribution may not be 
“insignificant in quality, when that contribution is measured 
against the dimension of the full invention,” inventors are named 
for entire patents, not just for a single claim.130 Since patents have 
multiple claims, and contribution to only one claim (or a part of a 
claim) is all that is necessary to be an inventor on the patent, an 
“inventor” on a patent may be a person who conceived of the most 
“inventive” aspect or a person who conceived of a relatively minor 
component.131 In the eyes of the law, both are inventors. 
                                                                                                     
 126. See, e.g., CHISUM, supra note 86, § 2.01, at 2–3 (stating that the 
requirement for inventorship “bars issuance of a patent for a conception derived 
from any source or person other than the person or persons named as the 
inventorship entity”).  
 127. Univ. of Utah, 734 F.3d at 1323 (quoting Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr 
Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227 – 28 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 
 128. See, e.g., CHISUM, supra note 86, § 2.02, at 2–7 (“It is frequently difficult 
to determine who has in fact contributed to the conception of a given invention 
because the contribution must consist of more than suggesting a desired result or 
following instructions of another.”). 
 129. See Bd. of Trs. v. Roche Molecular Sys., 563 U.S. 776, 785 (2011) 
(“[P]recedents confirm the general rule that rights in an invention belong to the 
inventor.”). 
 130. Nartron Corp. v. Schukra U.S.A., Inc., 558 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (quoting Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 131. See Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (“[A] co-inventor need not make a contribution to every claim of a patent.”). 
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B. The Process of Obtaining a Patent 
The initial step in the process of obtaining of a patent—called 
“patent prosecution”—is drafting a patent application.132 The 
application must include, among other things, a description of the 
invention and a claim or claims.133 The claims are a critical part of 
the patent application because they demarcate the boundaries of 
what the inventor is claiming she invented.134 After the inventor is 
satisfied with the content of her application she sends it to the 
Patent Office along with a filing fee.135 As of September 2018 the 
average wait time between filing an application and receiving an 
initial response from the examiner assigned to the application was 
about 16 months.136  
After reviewing the application, the examiner will typically 
issue an “office action” containing the examiner’s decision on 
whether to allow the claims.137 If the claims are rejected, the Office 
Action specifies why they are not being allowed.138 An examiner’s 
rejection can be based on overbroad claims, a defective 
                                                                                                     
 132. See MUELLER, supra note 110, at 42 (describing patent prosecution as 
“the process of preparing and filing a patent application . . . and thereafter 
interacting with the agency in order to obtain a U.S. patent” which “typically 
involves a multi-year negotiation”).  
 133. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.51 (2013) (providing a list of requirements for a patent 
application).  
 134. See Brian Farkas, Just How Broad Will My Patent Protection Be?, NOLO, 
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/just-how-broad-will-my-patent-
protection-be.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (“Patent claims establish the 
boundaries or scope of an invention. They are the standard by which patent rights 
are measured.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 135. See USPTO Fee Schedule, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-
resources/fees-and-payment/uspto-fee-schedule (last updated Oct. 1, 2018) (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2019) (listing the various charges associated with patent filings) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Note that all individual 
inventors qualify for a discounted rate as “small entities” under 37 C.F.R § 1.27 
(2018) and some qualify for a further discount as “micro entities” under 37 C.F.R 
§ 1.29 (2018).  
 136. Data Visualization Center: February 2019 Patents Data, at a Glance, 
USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml (last visited 
Mar. 10, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 137. See DAVID PRESSMAN, PATENT IT YOURSELF 340 (15th ed. 2011) 
(explaining that the “first Office Action” (OA) . . . consists of forms and a letter 
from the examiner in charge of your application”).  
 138. See id. (stating that an application will rarely be allowed in the first OA).  
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specification, prior art that the examiner has identified to show the 
invention is not novel or nonobvious, or “various other 
objections.”139 The inventor or her attorney will respond to the 
office action by amending claims to satisfy the examiner or arguing 
that the examiner has misunderstood or misconstrued a piece of 
prior art.140 Once the inventor has responded to the first office 
action she can expect to wait another several months for a 
response.141 This process can go on until the examiner allows the 
claims, the applicant gives up, or the applicant appeals.142 On 
average the entire prosecution process, from filing to patent grant, 
takes about 24 months.143  
IV. Patents as Credentials 
The core thesis of this Article is that patents are 
credentials — formal abstractions of a person’s inventive nature. 
Underlying patents as a credential are intertwined notions of 
artificiality and reality. Patents provide a reputational effect 
because they are defined units that distill a person’s life 
experiences into a quantifiable form. The reputational effect of 
patents, then, turns on two aspects: society’s general perception of 
patents and the formal mechanisms that authenticate the 
credential.144 
This Part begins with an examination of the social meaning of 
a patent. Just as a PhD or an award for philanthropy says 
something about the recipient, so too does society perceive patents 
as saying something about the persons named on them as 
inventors. We then construct the idea of patents as credentials in 
formal terms: the legitimacy of the issuer, the informational 
content of the credential itself, and the need of the audience to rely 
                                                                                                     
 139. Id. 
 140.  See id. at 341 (“Your response must take whatever action is necessary to 
overcome the objections and rejections listed in the OA.”).  
 141.  See id. (“About two to six months after you file your first amendment, 
you’ll receive a second OA from the PTO . . . .”). 
 142. See id. at 398 (summarizing the many steps that might be necessary 
during the application prosecution process). 
 143. Data Visualization Center, supra note 136.  
 144. Supra Part II. 
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on a patent rather than a direct examination of the underlying 
evidence of invention.  
A. The Social Meaning of a Patent 
A salient aspect of patents is the near-universal core meaning 
ascribed to them.145 Patents are widely associated with invention, 
new technological developments, and breakthroughs.146 They 
represent practical innovation rather than scientific discoveries or 
creative expression.147 Obtaining a patent means that the subject 
matter described therein is an invention; that it is something 
useful, novel, and nonobvious that its creator has given to the 
public.148 Only an invention is deserving of a patent, and one who 
obtains a patent is thus an inventor.149 Or in Carolyn Cooper’s 
words, “Of course, we recognize that not all inventions received 
patents. Still, all patents were, by definition, for inventions.”150 
 A full exploration of the social meaning of patents—and of 
what it means to be an inventor—deserves a much more extensive 
treatment than is possible in this Article.151 It would be foolish to 
                                                                                                     
 145. See JOSEPH ROSSMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE INVENTOR 235 (1931) (“[I]n 
spite of the fact that it is very difficult to define invention, the average college 
group has a very definite conception of invention which agrees very remarkably 
with the views of the Court . . . .”). 
 146. See id. at 9 (“The outstanding feature of all inventions is that they give 
something which has not existed before.”). 
 147. See, e.g., Pamela O. Long, Invention, Authorship, “Intellectual Property,” 
and the Origin of Patents: Notes Toward a Conceptual History, 32 TECH. & 
CULTURE 846, 848 (1991) (“The positive valuation of craft knowledge and material 
invention is a basic precondition for the development of intellectual property 
attitudes with regard to them.”). 
 148. See discussion supra Part III.A.1. 
 149. See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
 150. Carolyn C. Cooper, Social Construction of Invention through Patent 
Management: Thomas Blanchard’s Woodworking Machinery, 32 TECH. & 
CULTURE 960, 960 (1991). 
 151. For examples of historical works on inventors, see generally BEAUCHAMP, 
supra note 1; HAROLD EVANS, THEY MADE AMERICA (2004); FREEBERG, supra note 
33; CHRISTINE MACLEOD, HEROES OF INVENTION: TECHNOLOGY, LIBERALISM AND 
BRITISH IDENTITY, 1750–1914 (2007); DAVID G. MCCULLOUGH, THE WRIGHT 
BROTHERS (2015). Less directly studied is the social meaning of patents. See 
BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 6 (“[T]he historical law of patents remains in many 
ways unmapped, and its connection to the broader setting of legal and political 
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pretend that the only social meaning of patents is the one described 
below; the idea of patents is hardly linked solely to the glory of 
invention. A theme throughout American history and before is that 
of patents as oppressive tools of big business.152 Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Oren Bracha, and many others have written about 
the role of patents as tools of monopolists.153 There are the sewing 
machine patent wars,154 the litigation explosions,155 and, of course, 
the patent trolls.156 
That said, a consistent theme that emerges from the use of 
patents in society is that while there are variations in societal 
views of patents—and sometimes tensions with those 
variations— there is nonetheless a powerful core, one that 
stretches across individual facts and circumstances and typically 
emerges dominant among other themes: that of the patent as 
identifying an invention, created by an inventor.157 With that in 
mind, a few examples will suffice to establish that society 
understands that a patent identifies an invention; that it is a proxy 
for practical innovation conceived by a human; and that patent 
                                                                                                     
institutions unclear.”).  
 152. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 112, at 12. 
 153. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: 
NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, 1870–1970, at 188–204 (2015) (describing 
historical development of and laws related to intellectual property monopolies); 
OREN BRACHA, OWNING IDEAS: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 1790 – 1909, at 273 – 84 (2016) (describing the way in 
which patents were used as a tool by business leaders who were pursuing 
economic stabilization and corporate stability).  
 154. See Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent 
Thicket: The Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165, 168 (2011) 
(“The sewing machine was the result of numerous incremental and 
complementary inventive contributions, which led to a morass of patent 
infringement litigation given overlapping patent claims to the final commercial 
product.”).  
 155. See Christopher Beauchamp, The First Patent Litigation Explosion, 125 
YALE L.J. 848, 848 (2016) (stating that “at its height, the litigation explosion 
produced a political backlash that threatened to sweep away the patent system 
as we know it”). 
 156. See BRACHA, supra note 153, at 315 (“The resurgence of various 
industrial strategies for the use of patents gave rise to new discontent over ‘patent 
thickets’ and ‘patent trolls,’ not unlike the older ones.”). 
 157. See, e.g., MUELLER, supra note 110, at 1 (describing patents as “a 
powerful form of IP protection that conveys the right to exclude all others from 
unauthorized imitation or use of a patented invention”).  
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inventors are held up as occupying a special place in the 
advancement of the Republic.158 
From the earliest days of the young United States, patents 
were associated with inventions and practical innovation.159 One 
of the first new laws passed by Congress was the Patent Act of 
1790, which authorized the grant of patents to those persons who 
“invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture, engine, 
machine, or device, or any improvement therein not before known 
or used . . . .”160 In other words, an invention.  
Patent law treatises, unsurprisingly, drew a close link 
between patent and invention. Walker on Patents, a prominent 
nineteenth century treatise, observed that “patents are grantable 
for nothing but inventions. It is also the law that they can be 
granted only to those who invented the inventions they 
respectively cover, or to the assignees or legal representatives of 
those persons.”161 And, in the author’s view, patent inventors were 
quite special indeed.  
The right of property which an inventor has in his invention, is 
excelled in point of dignity, by no other property right whatever. 
It is equalled in point of dignity, only by the rights which 
authors have in their copyrighted books. The inventor is not the 
pampered favorite or beneficiary of the government, or of the 
nation. The benefits which he confers, are greater than those 
which he receives . . . . Their labor is the most dignified and the 
most honorable of all labor; and the resulting property is most 
perfectly theirs.162 
An emerging periodical literature during the nineteenth 
century further illustrates the early days of the American public’s 
                                                                                                     
 158.  See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 150, at 960–61 (“He was able to make a 
career of inventing because the society in which he lived—the 19th-century 
United States—gave him material reward as well as fame for his acts of 
invention . . . From this we can infer that these societies have generally approved 
of invention and intended to encourage it.”).  
 159. Note that “patents” have a long history prior to the creation of the United 
States, and not one necessarily confined to technological innovation. For a history 
of patent law see, for example, BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 13 – 34; MERGES & 
DUFFY, supra note 112, at 3 – 19. 
 160. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 (repealed 1793). 
 161. ALBERT H. WALKER, TEXT-BOOK OF THE PATENT LAWS § 44, at 31 (1883). 
 162. Id. § 152, at 102 – 03. 
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link between patents, inventors and invention.163 Scientific 
American, launched in 1845, provides a particularly prominent 
example.164 Patents played a major role in Scientific American 
where patent lists constituted a “chief feature” during the 
nineteenth century.165 But nineteenth century periodicals that 
focused on patents and inventions were hardly limited to Scientific 
American, as Frank Luther Mott observed; this period was one of 
“amazing fecundity in invention,” in which “a number of 
periodicals were devoted to mechanics and patents.”166 Each of 
these periodicals placed inventors, and their patents, up on high. 
From these nineteenth century beginnings emerged an 
understanding of patents as defining what was an invention. 
Steven Lubar writes about the early years of the patent system, a 
period in which inventors “bemoaned the lack of enthusiasm for 
invention” and “complained bitterly about the patent system and 
about the public’s low regard for patents and patentees.”167 As the 
nineteenth century progressed, however, Americans came to 
believe that technological advances were central to American 
economic success.168 With that changing belief came a sharper 
focus on the role of the patent system. Great courtroom battles and 
Supreme Court debates took place, from the arguments of Daniel 
                                                                                                     
 163. For example, the first issue of Scientific American, published in 1845,  
contained a list of agricultural patents issued in 1844; subsequent issues reported 
in more depth on recently patented inventions. See, e.g., Recent Inventions, 45 SCI. 
AM. 416, 418 (1881) (reporting on recent inventions and describing their 
usefulness).  
 164. See FRANK LUTHER MOTT, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN MAGAZINES, VOLUME 
II: 1850–1865, at 316–24 (1938) (describing the development of Scientific 
American and the way it “had a significance—at least for its first sixty or seventy 
years — unapproached in kind and effect by any other periodical”). 
 165. Id. at 323. Mott observes that Scientific American’s focus on patents 
began to dwindle in the twentieth century, and its scope broadened to focus on 
popular science generally. It is also worth noting that practitioners of patent law 
had a supporting interest in Scientific American. See BRACHA, supra note 153, at 
212–13 (noting that “[t]he science and technology magazine that was launched in 
1845 was owned by the Munn & Co. patent agency”). 
 166. MOTT, supra note 164, at 80. 
 167. Steven Lubar, The Transformation of Antebellum Patent Law, 32 TECH. 
& CULTURE 932, 936 (1991).  
 168. See FREEBERG, supra note 33, at 140 (describing the “new aristocracy of 
practical intellect”); id. at 158 (“In the late nineteenth century, Americans read 
accounts of new inventions in almost every issue of their newspapers.”).  
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Webster against those of Rufus Choate in “The Great India Rubber 
Case”169 to the Telephone Cases170 culminating in a Supreme Court 
opinion that takes up an entire volume of the United States 
Reporter.171 Throughout this period of technological ascendency, 
patents and inventions were tightly intertwined172 — so much so 
that Joseph Rossman, Chemical Engineer, Patent Examiner, and 
Editor of the Journal of the Patent Office Society, began his 1931 
book The Psychology of the Inventor with a tribute to inventors, 
inventions and patents:  
The profound alteration in our physical environment, especially 
during the last hundred years, has been effected to a large 
extent by our inventors. It is generally acknowledged that the 
entire progress of the human race from primitive times to its 
present level has been made possible by the inventor of physical 
devices. As an innovator and leader, the inventor performs one 
of the most important functions in society, for he holds the key 
to further progress.173 
There is a strong argument that the modern concept of 
invention itself was constructed through patent law, much of it 
during the nineteenth century.174 Historian Carolyn C. Cooper, for 
example, uses the story of Thomas Blanchard’s woodworking 
                                                                                                     
 169. See Lubar, supra note 167, at 956 (describing that the case “held the 
attention of inventors not only because of its importance for patent law but also 
as a courtroom drama”). 
 170. Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1 (1888). 
 171. See BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 58 (describing the many ways the 
Telephone Cases was “legally and commercially momentous”).  
 172. For examples of historical scholarship that closely associates invention 
and patents, see generally BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1; FREEBERG, supra note 33; 
Long, supra note 147; Lubar, supra note 167. 
 173. ROSSMAN, supra note 145, at v.  
 174. Like every concept, the notion of “invention” can be traced yet further 
backward; in this case, finding predicate steps in the development of Western 
notions of individuality, authorship, and medieval urbanism. See, e.g., Long, 
supra note 147, at 869–70 (“Medieval cities and the market economies that 
developed within and among them provided the essential context for the 
emergence of a fully developed concept of intellectual property.”). See generally 
SCIENTIFIC AUTHORSHIP: CREDIT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN SCIENCE (Mario 
Biagioli & Peter Galison, eds., 2003) (exploring the development of scientific 
authorship throughout history). 
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machinery to illustrate how the meaning of invention was 
constructed both in individual cases and more broadly.  
Invention in the United States in the 19th century was to a 
significant degree socially constructed through patent 
management. By social construction of invention I mean not 
only the social shaping of specific inventions but also, at a 
deeper level, the determining of the very rules by which people 
defined ‘newness’ in inventions. Since originality is the defining 
characteristic of any invention, the gradual social formation of 
decision rules for originality was tantamount to defining 
invention itself.175  
Making a similar claim, Christopher Beauchamp writes, “The 
popular and scholarly literature about who ‘really’ invented the 
telephone misses a broader point: that the question itself is a legal 
artifact.”176 Fundamentally,  
“Who invented the telephone?” was a question defined by law. 
Legal rules shaped not only the standards of proof but also the 
terms of inquiry: defining what it meant to be a first and true 
inventor and prescribing the ways that a would-be great 
inventor needed to describe his achievements in order to gain a 
patent of maximum breadth.177 
Ultimately, it was the patent that defined the inventor of these 
revolutionary new technologies.  
By the middle of the twentieth century the notion of “inventor” 
as exceptional, and its linkage to patents, was strongly engrained 
within the popular psyche, as Justice Douglas’s concurring opinion 
from Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment 
Corp.178 illustrates:  
The invention, to justify a patent, had to serve the ends of 
science—to push back the frontiers of chemistry, physics, and 
the like; to make a distinctive contribution to scientific 
                                                                                                     
 175. Cooper, supra note 150, at 960. 
 176. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 4; see also Kara Swanson, ‘Great Men,’ Law, 
and the Social Construction of Technology, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1093, 1097–98 
(2018) (reviewing BEAUCHAMP and examining the complex nature of 
inventor-myth stories). 
 177. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 5. 
 178. 340 U.S. 147 (1950). 
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knowledge. That is why through the years the opinions of the 
Court commonly have taken “inventive genius” as the test.179 
Justice Douglas’s concurrence demonstrates both the 
idealistic view of patents as only available for great, pioneering 
inventions, and the less laudatory view (in his eyes) that patents 
were being issued for “gadgets,” the work of a mere mechanic.180 
Yet, inherent in both views is the idea of the patent-holding 
inventor as a person who makes new combinations and devices, 
whether they be paradigm-shifting or modestly new and useful 
improvements.181  
Popular culture often draws upon the shared social meaning 
of patents as associated with, or reflecting, invention. Thus, the 
first official thing that Mark Twain’s engineer-narrator in A 
Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court did upon becoming the 
chief minister was “to start a patent office; for I knew that a 
country without a patent office and good patent laws was just a 
crab, and couldn’t travel any way but sideways or backways.”182 
The use of patents in popular media highlights the strength 
and acceptance of their core meaning.183 Popular media sometimes 
employs jokes that revolve around patents or constructs absurd 
plots involving patents.184 While these portrayals are sometimes 
                                                                                                     
 179. Id. at 154 (Douglas, J., concurring); see also Cuno Eng’g Corp. v. 
Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941) (“[T]he new device, however 
useful it may be, must reveal the flash of creative genius not merely the skill of 
the calling.”).  
 180. See Great Atlantic, 340 U.S. at 155 (“The Constitution never sanctioned 
the patenting of gadgets. Patents serve a higher end—the advancement of 
science. . . . [I]t has to be of such quality and distinction that masters of the 
scientific field in which it falls will recognize it as an advance.”).  
 181. Christopher Beauchamp offers another example of the linkage between 
patent and invention during the first half of the twentieth century in his 
description of the 1936 centennial of the U.S. Patent Office, in which speakers 
“lauded the leading inventions of the day and celebrated a patent system that had 
‘served as a model for the world and made possible unified, coordinated progress 
toward happier living for all peoples.’” BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 205. 
 182. MARK TWAIN, A CONNECTICUT YANKEE IN KING ARTHUR’S COURT 107 
(1996).  
 183. For a comprehensive survey of patent attorneys in mass entertainment 
forms of popular media, see generally Robert M. Jarvis, The Patent Attorney in 
Popular Culture, 98 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 469 (2016). 
 184. For an example of humor and patents, see The Big Bang Theory: The 
Application Deterioration (Chuck Lorre Productions broadcast Mar. 10, 2016), in 
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inaccurate,185 the jokes and plots wouldn’t work if there weren’t a 
strong social understanding of the connection between patents and 
invention. Thus, the episode of The Simpsons in which Homer 
Simpson takes up inventing and ultimately develops a 
patent-worthy invention is funny in part precisely because Homer 
is not what society would consider an “inventor” and his 
“invention” —an automatic hammer—does not serve to change this 
perception.186  
The social link between invention and patents has hardly gone 
unnoticed by legal scholars. Mark Lemley’s article The Myth of the 
Sole Inventor is premised on the idea that there is a widely held 
belief in the “individual inventor” idea.187 “Any elementary school 
student can recite a number of canonical American invention 
stories. . . . Patent law is built around these canonical tales.”188 
Indeed, “the very theory of patent law is based on the idea that a 
lone genius can solve problems that stump the experts, and that 
the lone genius will do so only if properly incented by the lure of a 
patent.”189 Embracing the idea of myth, Dan Burk describes the 
symbolic function of patents for businesses: “acquisition of patents 
appears strongly ceremonial, demonstrating organizational 
adherence to prevalent narratives of innovation, competition, and 
success.”190 And in Inventing Norms, Will Hubbard describes ways 
in which patent law shapes social norms about invention, such as 
                                                                                                     
which three of the principal characters conceive of an invention and seek to patent 
it.  
 185. See James Daily, Orphan Black, L. & MULTIVERSE (May 1, 2014), 
http://lawandthemultiverse.com/2014/05/01/orphan-black/#more-2592 (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2019) (discussing the use of patents in the television series 
Orphan Black) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 186. The Simpsons: The Wizard of Evergreen Terrace (Fox Network broadcast 
Sept. 20, 1998).  
 187. See Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 
709, 709 (2012) (“The theory of patent law is based on the idea that a lone genius 
can solve problems that stump the experts, and that the lone genius will do so 
only if properly incented. But the canonical story of the lone genius inventor is 
largely a myth.”). 
 188. Id. at 710.  
 189. Id.; see also Jessica Silbey, The Mythical Beginnings of Intellectual 
Property, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 319, 323 – 27 (2008) (describing the “origin myth” 
of patent law). 
 190. Burk, supra note 5, at 442. 
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by “identifying meaningful inventions” or helping to “ensure that 
the correct inventor is credited with any invention.”191  
So potent is the association of patents with invention and 
innovation, that a robust social sciences literature has emerged 
that uses patents and patent citation data as measures of inventive 
activity.192 Economists routinely use patent metrics in testing 
theories and assessing the evidence supporting historical claims 
about technological progress and innovation generally.193 Clarisa 
Long summarizes: “Econometric models of firm productivity often 
create a patent production function in which patenting is a 
dependent variable and inventive output by the firm is an 
independent variable.”194 The link is not indisputable or perfect, 
but the existence of these studies illustrates its presence.  
None of this is to suggest that the social meaning of patents 
should be seen as a monolithic, homogenous construct; as 
recognized at the outset of this section, it is not. In particular, the 
audience matters.195 Each of the sources described above can be 
seen as speaking or reflecting different possible audiences. A 
patent might have a specific meaning in one community, and a 
different meaning in another. And yet, the central point is that 
there is enough commonality of the social meaning of a patent for 
it to have a widely-recognized effect; more so than many other 
cultural structures. Taken together, there are enough pixels to 
form a distinct image in which patents are strongly associated with 
                                                                                                     
 191. Hubbard, supra note 14, at 398, 400. 
 192. See, e.g., Adam B. Jaffe & Gaétan de Rassenfosse, Patent Citation Data 
in Social Science Research: Overview and Best Practices, 68 J. ASS’N INFO. SCI. & 
TECH. 1360, 1366  68 (2017) (reviewing literature on use of patent citation data); 
Petra Moser, Patents and Innovation in Economic History, 8 ANN. REV. ECON. 241, 
244 (2016) (observing that “patent counts have become the standard proxy for 
innovation” and cautioning that it is important to keep in mind that “patents are 
an ‘imperfect, fallible measure’ of the ‘net accretion of economically valuable 
knowledge” (quoting Zvi Griliches, Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A 
Survey, 28 J. ECON. LIT. 1661, 1670 (1990)). 
 193. Moser, supra note 192, at 244. For a classic example of this literature, 
see Zvi Griliches, Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey, 28 J. ECON. 
LIT. 1661, 1670 (1990). 
 194. Long, supra note 5, at 651. 
 195.  See Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law’s Audience, 97 
MINN. L. REV. 72, 75 (2012) (arguing that patent law could operate more 
effectively if it “incorporated a more realistic conception of its audience”). 
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inventions and practical innovations. It is this core meaning that 
allows an individual named on a patent to show the world that “I 
am an inventor.”196  
B. Legitimacy, Information, and Necessity 
How have patents become such powerful social artifacts? In 
the following analysis, we apply our model of credentials to 
patents. This analysis illuminates how, through their role as 
formalized abstractions, patents have come to serve as 
mechanisms of reputation.  
1. The Legitimacy of the Issuer 
Who issues patents? The answer is the Federal 
Government,197 traditionally an entity with a high degree of 
legitimacy. It makes the laws, after all. And the Patent Office is 
one of the most legitimate government agencies, with a heritage 
going back almost to the first days of the country. As described in 
Part III, examiners in the Patent Office follow extensive 
procedures to ensure that the requirements of patentability are 
met. Every patent ever issued—except for some of the early 
patents destroyed in the Patent Office fire of 1836—is available for 
public search and review.198 Patent examiners are not perfect, but 
no examination is perfect either. In short, it is difficult to find 
another issuer of credentials, public or private, with the 
widespread recognition and legitimacy of the Patent Office. 
Two aspects of the Patent Office are worth mentioning. Since 
U.S. patents, unlike many other types of credentials, are issued by 
                                                                                                     
 196. See John Seabrook, The Flash of Genius, NEW YORKER (Jan. 11, 1993), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1993/01/11/the-flash-of-genius (last visited 
Feb. 19, 2019) (“I want you to understand that I am wearing a little badge here, 
and that badge says that I am an inventor, and it says I am a net contributor to 
society.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 197.  See General Information Concerning Patents, USPTO, 
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-concerning-
patents (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (stating that the USPTO issues all patents 
in the United States) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 198. See id. (stating that the USPTO maintains a search room for public use). 
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a single entity, whose modern formal name is the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office,199 the only way to get a United 
States patent is through that entity.200 Contrast this with 
educational credentials—such as high school diplomas, college 
degrees, or a Ph.D. in marine biology—that are issued by an array 
of different institutions, each with their own reputation and 
identity. The audience of a patent need not evaluate the relative 
weight of different issuers of a patent. This unity enhances the 
legitimacy of the issuer of a credential. The same Patent Office that 
issued Thomas Edison’s patent on the incandescent lamp issues all 
other patents.  
In addition, the consequences of defying the obligations 
imposed by statutory patent law and the rules of the Patent Office 
during prosecution help maintain its legitimacy. These obligations 
flow from the doctrine of inequitable conduct, which sharply 
punishes applicants who behave inappropriately during patent 
prosecution.201 “To prevail on the defense of inequitable conduct, 
the accused infringer must prove that the applicant 
misrepresented or omitted material information with the specific 
intent to deceive the PTO.”202 Although the Federal Circuit has 
raised the thresholds for both materiality and intent in recent 
years,203 the doctrine remains potent. This is particularly true 
given the consequence of an inequitable finding, which is to render 
                                                                                                     
 199. That said, other countries have their own patent offices, and it is possible 
to envision a world in which different countries’ patent offices compete in the 
same way that academic institutions compete. The comparative social meaning of 
patents is a subject that is certainly worth further investigation.  
 200.  See supra note 197 and accompanying texts (noting that only the USPTO 
issues patents on behalf of the United States government). 
 201. See Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Therasense v. Becton 
Dickinson: A First Impression, 14 YALE J.L. & TECH. 226, 228 (2012) (describing 
inequitable conduct as “a judicially created doctrine developed to punish patent 
applicants who behave inappropriately during patent prosecution, the ex parte 
process of patent creation.”); see also Long, supra note 5, at 668–70 (describing 
the role that the inequitable conduct doctrine plays in the process of patent 
signaling). 
 202. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1287 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 203. See id. at 1290 (“This court now tightens the standards for finding both 
intent and materiality in order to redirect a doctrine that has been overused to 
the detriment of the public.”). 
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the entire patent unenforceable and generally leads to an award of 
attorneys’ fees against the party asserting the patent.204 Antitrust 
claims are also possible.205 Furthermore, patent attorneys who 
breach their duty of candor to the Patent Office may be subject to 
discipline, including losing their license to practice before the 
office.206 All of these mechanisms encourage fair dealing by the 
applicant.  
2. The Information Communicated by a Patent 
The social meaning of patents is one thing, but what about the 
quality of the information that is actually provided? Patents, it 
turns out, fit well into notions of direct communication of the 
bearer’s achievement of certain criteria, signaling, and sorting.  
a. Direct Communication of Information 
As Clarisa Long observes, “In the most straightforward 
instance, obtaining a patent on an invention communicates 
information about the invention to the public at low cost. 
Individual patents can contain a wealth of otherwise unobtainable 
information about the invention and are often quite lengthy.”207 
These disclosures can both provide information about the technical 
content of the invention,208 as well as nontechnical information 
                                                                                                     
 204. See id. at 1288 (“Unlike validity defenses, which are claim specific, see 
35 U.S.C. § 288, inequitable conduct regarding any single claim renders the entire 
patent unenforceable.”); Jeffrey D. Mills, Patent Litigation Two Years after 
Octane Fitness: How to Enhance the Prospect of Recovering Attorneys’ Fees, 45 
AIPLA Q.J. 27, 52 (2017) (observing that “inequitable conduct has been long 
recognized as a sufficient basis, by itself, for declaring a case exceptional and 
awarding fees.”).  
 205. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System: A 
Reexamination, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 467, 549 – 52 (2015) (describing circumstances in 
which Walker Process fraud might be alleged (citing Walker Process Equip., Inc. 
v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174  80 (1965)). 
 206. See Tamsen Valoir & David Hricik, Patents and Trademarks: The Duty 
of Good Faith, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 287, 293 (2007) (describing the 
consequences of violating the duty of candor). 
 207. Long, supra note 5, at 647. 
 208. For an overview of the purposes served by patent law’s disclosure 
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about the invention and its inventors.209 Put simply, patents codify 
information.210 Of course, these disclosures are hardly perfect; an 
extensive literature has catalogued the information that is not 
provided by the disclosures, and the incentives to reveal as little as 
necessary.211 Worse perhaps, patents — especially the claims — are 
often written in “patentese,” which Sean Seymore defines as “the 
specialized language that patents are written in.”212 But, for those 
patents that are written clearly and logically213 or for those readers 
                                                                                                     
requirement, see Rantanen, supra note 115, at 370. For an in-depth discussion of 
the disclosures of patents, see J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 917, 940  46 (2011) (noting that disclosure is the principal benefit the 
public receives from the patent system); Jeanne Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 
IOWA L. REV. 539, 544  60 (2008) (analyzing the theory of patents and the current 
role of patents in research); Timothy Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU 
L. REV. 123, 131 (2006) (“[T]he primary function of the patent system is to promote 
public welfare through the disclosure of new inventions.”); Lisa Larrimore 
Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 
554  61 (2012) (reviewing disclosure as a compelling justification for patents); 
Sean Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 
627 (2010) (critiquing the current form of the patent, including the current 
disclosure framework).  
 209. See J. Jonas Anderson, Nontechnical Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 
159097 (2016) (“Nontechnical disclosure is the ability of a patent to disclose 
information that is not related to the traditional disclosure goal of teaching.”). 
 210. See Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification, 23 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1009, 1017 (2008) (discussing the role of patents in 
knowledge codification). 
 211. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (discussing patent law’s 
disclosure requirement); see also Burk, supra note 16, at 1610 (describing the 
various silences resulting from disclosure); id. at 101416 (discussing the concept 
of “tacit knowledge”). 
 212. See Seymore, supra note 208, at 634 (noting that “patentese stretches the 
disclosure”); see also Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 
1512, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, J., dissenting) (“We have made the 
infringement analysis so convoluted it is impossible for most district court judges 
untrained in ‘patentese’ to follow, much less jurors.”), rev’d, 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
 213. See Janice M. Mueller, Crafting Patents for the Twenty-First Century: 
Maximize Patent Strength and Avoid Prosecution History Estoppel in a 
Post-Markman/Hilton Davis World, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCIETY 499, 
503 (1997) 
Although the phrase “reader-friendly” as applied to “patents” may at 
first seem trite, if not borderline heretical, “reader-friendliness” has 
now become an essential benchmark for patent drafters. The 
sophisticated patent attorney will strive to make the job of judge and 
jury easier by crafting a clearly-written, logically laid-out patent 
document. 
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that can understand “patentese,” a patent can function like a set 
of CliffsNotes for the technology, allowing the reader to quickly get 
up to speed on what the inventor has actually done. In legal terms, 
what the inventor was in possession of at the time of filing.214 
In addition to the actual content of the patent itself, the 
criteria necessary to obtain a patent helps communicate 
information about the credential. By issuing a patent, the Patent 
Office certifies that the invention claimed meets these criteria.215 
With a patent, those basic criteria are mostly easy to understand 
and convey. To be deserving of a patent, an invention must be 
novel, it must be useful, and it must be nonobvious.216 These 
criteria are so simple, they can be conveyed in a children’s book. 
Take, for example, the book Inventions: That Could Have Changed 
The World . . . But Didn’t!217 Its shtick is that it describes 
inventions that are interesting and creative, but which were 
largely commercial flops. Things like a parachute hat for escaping 
from a tall building. Early on in the book, the author describes 
what the inventions are, where they come from, and tells the 
reader about patents. Here’s an excerpt that illustrates how easy 
it is to convey the basic criteria of a patent:  
Not all patents are approved. In fact, in order for your invention 
to receive a patent, it has to pass three tests. Test #1: Is it novel? 
                                                                                                     
 
 214. See Ariad Pharms. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (en banc) 
A description of the claimed invention allows the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (“PTO”) to examine applications effectively; 
courts to understand the invention, determine compliance with the 
statute, and to construe the claims; and the public to understand and 
improve upon the invention and to avoid the claimed boundaries of the 
patentee’s exclusive rights. 
 215.  See supra note 197 (“The examination of the application consists of a 
study of the application for compliance with the legal requirements . . . . If the 
examiner’s decision on patentability is favorable, a patent is granted.”). 
 216. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2012). The exception may be patentable subject 
matter—an issue that in the last few years has entered a crisis state among 
patent attorneys. 
 217. See generally JOE RHATIGAN, INVENTIONS: THAT COULD HAVE CHANGED 
THE WORLD . . . BUT DIDN’T! (2015). 
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In other words, is it new or does it have a new part that another 
inventor hasn’t already thought of? 
Test #2: Is it useful? Does your invention have a practical use 
and can someone actually create it? 
Test #3: Is it inventive? This means that your invention isn’t 
obvious and couldn’t have been thought of by just anyone with 
basic knowledge about the subject.218 
Patents also readily communicate who the inventor is. A 
simple, yet powerful way that a patent communicates that the 
person named on it is an inventor is by stating it right on the top 
of the patent itself. Figure 1219 is a reproduction of the top portion 
of U.S. Patent No. 8,000,000. It is readily apparent who the 
inventors of this visual prosthesis are: Robert J. Greenberg, Kelly 
H. McClure, and Arup Roy. 
 
Older patents emphasized the inventors’ names to an even greater 
extent, as Orville and Wilbur Wright’s patent on a 
“Flying-machine” illustrates in Figure 2.220 
                                                                                                     
 218. Id. at 8. 
 219. U.S. Patent No. 8,000,000 B2 (issued Aug. 16, 2011). 
 220. U.S. Patent No. 821,393 (issued May 22, 1906). 
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Battles over the ownership of patents are classic stories in 
American society and culture, often invoking themes of the 
underdog, or reaping what one has sown, or of monopoly and 
competition. A strong thread of the true inventor’s natural rights 
entitlement to a patent runs through these stories.221 Consider the 
inventorship battles of O’Reilly versus Morse;222 of Bell versus 
Gray;223 of Edison versus Westinghouse;224 of the Wright 
Brothers,225 or, more recently, of Doudna versus Zhang over 
CRISPR.226 These inventorship battles captured the public eye. 
History records the winner of the patent as the inventor; the loser 
is relegated to counter-narratives at best. In this way, patents 
                                                                                                     
 221. See, e.g., Mossoff, supra note 154 (describing the mass of patent 
infringement claims involved in the invention of the sewing machine). 
 222. See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 63 (1854) (deciding the true inventor 
of the electro-magnetic telegraph). 
 223. See BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1 (describing Bell’s battle to claim his 
patent). 
 224. See Consolidated Electric Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co., 159 U.S. 
465 (1895) (deciding the rightful inventor of an electric light); FREEBERG, supra 
note 33 (describing Edison’s race to file his patent). The story of Edison’s patent 
fights forms the heart of Graham Moore’s legal thriller, The Last Days of Night 
(2016), soon to be a major motion picture. 
 225. See MCCULLOUGH, supra note 151 (describing the Wright Brothers’ 
patent litigation). 
 226. See Jacob S. Sherkow, Inventive Steps: The CRISPR Patent Dispute and 
Scientific Progress, 18 EMBO REP. 1047, 1047  50 (2017) (discussing the litigation 
surrounding the CRISPR patent and its implications in the field of molecular 
biology). 
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build the historical record. Want to know who invented the X? Just 
look it up—the inventor is clearly indicated. Indeed, the author of 
The Psychology of the Inventor observed that this feature was what 
made it so advantageous to use patents as the mechanism for 
identifying the inventors he studied: “The great advantage in 
limiting the study to patentees arises from their accessibility 
through the records of the Patent Office. The patentee can be 
readily identified with a definite invention which has received the 
approval of the Government.”227 
b. Patents as Signals 
In addition to compressing information about the invention 
that the inventor has received a patent for, patents provide 
information about the bearer in more complex ways.  
The concept of patents as signals of firm attributes that are 
not easily discernible is the subject of an extensive description and 
analysis in Clarisa Long’s 2002 article Patent Signals.228 The 
essence of Long’s theory is that “Intellectual property [and patents 
in particular] can serve as a signal of less readily measurable 
attributes.”229 Long elaborates on the signaling function of a firm’s 
patents:  
Under numerous explorations in signaling theory, parties 
signal positive attributes by engaging in costly behavior that 
parties without positive attributes would find hard to mimic. 
Just as a firm may use conspicuous consumption of advertising 
as a means of conveying a message about itself, so firms may 
also use conspicuous consumption of patents as a means of 
displaying desirable qualities. At the very least, if a firm were 
to obtain far more or fewer patents than similarly situated 
firms—particularly competitors in the same industry—its 
conspicuousness would communicate some sort of information 
to the market.230 
                                                                                                     
 227. See ROSSMAN, supra note 145 (studying the motivations and psychology 
of the patentee). 
 228. Long, supra note 5. 
 229. Id. at 646. 
 230. Id. at 648 – 49. 
PATENTS AS CREDENTIALS 357 
Long also suggests that patents may be an effective signal of 
low future discount rates because “obtaining patents may be a 
signal of the firm’s willingness to invest in making credible 
statements, because patentees can suffer costs if the information 
in the patent turns out to be inaccurate.”231  
Long’s model provides a way for investors to distinguish 
between “innovative firms”—those that “have a portfolio of 
research projects that managers believe will have a high expected 
payoff on average”—and “boring firms”—those that “have a 
portfolio of research projects that they believe will have low 
expected payoffs.”232 Assuming that information is asymmetric 
(that is, investors don’t know whether they are investing in 
innovative or boring firms, but the firms know what type of firm 
they are), there is no way for investors to distinguish between the 
two types. Long theorizes that patents provide a way for innovative 
firms to signal their innovative characteristic.233 Patents can do so 
if the behavior—obtaining the patent—“imposes substantial 
monetary or reputation costs if the signal is inaccurate.”234 
Patents, Long argues, meet these criteria: the consequences of 
intentional misrepresentations in a patent application are severe; 
in addition, it may be less costly, in theory, for innovative firms to 
meet the criteria necessary to obtain patents than for boring firms 
to do so.235  
Although proposed in the context of firms and capital markets, 
Long’s theory of patent signaling is applicable to individual 
inventors as well, although with a bit of a twist.236 Patents present 
administrative challenges and expenses to obtain. Only true 
                                                                                                     
 231. Id. at 649. 
 232. Id. at 655.  
 233. See id. at 656 (“[I]nnovative firms will have an incentive to disclose the 
superior nature of their research results so that they can appear more attractive 
to investors.”). 
 234. Id. at 657. 
 235. See id. at 657–58 
Innovative firms desiring to maximize firm value have the incentive to 
seek patents, and therefore to signal accurately, if their cost . . . of 
doing so is less than the change in value an innovative firm would 
experience by being labeled a boring firm . . . . [A] signal can still 
produce a separation between innovative and boring firms when it is 
not costly to send the signal but costly to send it falsely.  
 236. Long, supra note 5. 
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inventors — or those who think that the patent is valuable — may 
be willing to undertake these expenses. The value of a patent as a 
signal of economic worth of the individual may cause individuals 
to seek patents even if the exclusionary value is relatively low. The 
desire for approbation may also push individuals to seek patents. 
Of course, if the process is such that it is equally easy for a 
non-inventor to obtain a patent as it is an inventor, then the signal 
is of limited value. But just as it may be less costly for an 
innovative firm to obtain patents, it may be less costly for an 
inventor who has already invented to obtain a patent for her 
invention. To put it another way, the costs of signaling one’s 
inventiveness through a patent are lower for a person who has 
created an invention — sparked by whatever reasons for inventing 
she is driven by237 — than for one who has not. And just as obtaining 
patents may be less costly for Long’s “innovative” firms than for 
“boring” firms, it may be less costly for the naturally inventive than 
for the person who lacks that characteristic.238  
c. Patents as Filters 
Just as patents may function as signals of an individuals’ 
tendency towards inventiveness, or at least of the creation of an 
invention, so too may patents function as filters that select for 
those who possess a particular characteristic.239 In this sense, 
patents function less as costly indicators of a characteristic and 
more as a straightforward selection mechanism. The dirt is sifted 
through the pan and gold is left on top. Here, the gold are those 
inventions that possess the necessary characteristics, along with 
those individuals who possess the ingenuity necessary to invent.  
Consider, for example, the doctrine of non-obviousness. The 
doctrine “measures whether subject matter claimed to be 
patentable is a sufficient technological advance over existing art to 
                                                                                                     
 237. An extensive literature discusses reasons why creators create and 
inventors invent for reasons other the monetary reward of a patent. See supra 
notes 35–36, 43 and accompanying text. 
 238. Long, supra note 5, and accompanying text. 
 239. See Merges, infra note 241, at 17 (describing the factual inquiries taken 
to determine the validity of a patent). 
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warrant the grant of a patent.”240 In theory, at least, this statutory 
test “serves a gatekeeping function; it seeks to reward inventions 
that, viewed prospectively, have a low probability of success.”241 
But a patent is not merely a reward for investing in the chase; it is 
only obtainable for the capture of the invention — to the victor go 
the spoils.242 Patent law thus grants patents to those who have 
succeeded at producing an invention that at the end of the 
day —  after assessing the scope and content of the prior art, the 
differences between the prior art and the claimed invention, and 
the level of ordinary skill in the art — is nonobvious.243  
What the patenting process does, then, is filter out those 
results that are not inventions from those that are. In so doing, it 
also filters out those who are not inventors from those that are. 
And although patent law specifically instructs that “the manner in 
which the invention was made” cannot negate patentability,244 it’s 
not as if the underlying characteristics of the inventor and the 
circumstances of invention have no effect at all. If that were so, the 
world would be a much more homogenous place.245  
3. The Necessity of Relying on the Credential 
The mechanisms described above explain how a patent can 
provide information about the bearer. But why rely on such 
compressions and even more complex mechanisms? After all, isn’t 
it better to read Herman Melville’s Moby Dick itself than the 
CliffsNotes? Or worse, to rely on the fact that someone is named 
                                                                                                     
 240. Lee Petherbridge & Jason Rantanen, In Memoriam Best Mode, 64 STAN. 
L. REV. ONLINE 125, 127 (2012). 
 241. Robert Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 1, 2 (1992). 
 242. See Lemley, supra note 187, at 749 (describing the racing theory of patent 
law).  
 243. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 – 18 (1966). 
 244. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2018). 
 245. None of this should be taken to suggest that patent examination is a 
perfect filter; that is hardly so. See, e.g., Mark Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the 
Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1528 (2001) (“The law should not ignore the 
fact that a patent application has been examined, but it seems clear we give that 
examination process far too much weight.”). But, more on this in Part V. 
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an inventor without even closely examining the patent? The short 
answer—as it is with many credentials—is that direct observation 
of the experience is typically difficult, if not impossible.  
While the basic criteria that must be satisfied to obtain a 
patent are simple enough to understand,246 they can be awfully 
hard to assess in light of the technical and often highly detailed 
subject matter of the invention. Furthermore, they are evaluated 
through a rigorous examination process.247 This is where use of a 
person with expertise to determine whether those criteria are 
satisfied comes into play. The nuances of patent law can be 
complicated, but it’s the technical questions of patentability that 
often makes the subject impenetrable. Examiners with an 
understanding of the field are tasked with figuring out whether 
the invention meets the criteria for a patent.248 Of course, they’re 
not perfect, but perfection isn’t the point. A reasonable assessment 
of whether the facts of the invention meet the criteria for 
patentability is what matters. In other words, it isn’t easy to know 
whether something is an invention or someone is an inventor. The 
audience must mostly rely on the proxy—the credential—of a 
patent.  
While the patent can provide information about the invention, 
as described above, that disclosure is not complete. And while some 
individuals may be able to examine the contents of the patent, and 
assess the quality of the inventor’s contribution, most people 
cannot. Even though patents disclose the invention, they do so in 
their own language, a hybrid of technical and legal terminology— a 
characteristic that Timothy Holbrook refers to as the “Janus-like 
nature” of patents249—and Sean Seymore and others describe as 
                                                                                                     
 246. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101  03, 112 (2012). 
 247. See id. § 131 (stating that the “[d]irector shall cause an examination to 
be made of the application and the alleged new invention”). 
 248. See General Information, supra note 197 (“The work of examining 
applications for patents is divided among a number of examining technology 
centers (TCs), each TC having jurisdiction over certain assigned fields of 
technology.”). 
 249. Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND. 
L.J. 779, 781 (2011). “Janus” is a figure of ancient Roman mythology that is 
typically depicted as having two faces. Janus, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Janus-Roman-god (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For difficulties with the 
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“patentese.”250 As most patent doctrines revolve around the 
touchstone of the “person of ordinary skill in the art,”251 patents 
are necessarily written for those of skill in the art; they are not 
designed to be understandable to those outside that club.252 
Rather, it is largely the non-technical disclosures—application 
date, patent name, assignee — that are accessible to the general 
audience.253 And the identity of the inventor is one such 
non-technical disclosure. Thus, the patent itself more easily 
conveys to society who the inventor is than the specific details of 
the invention. The public can easily understand the patent as 
indicating the identity of an inventor, even where it might be 
impossible without extensive training in that field to evaluate the 
inventive contribution described in the patent.  
If the inventive contribution described in the patent is difficult 
for the public to appreciate, the more generalized intellectual 
contribution of the inventor may be even more so—especially 
where that generalized contribution is supported by little or no 
evidence. David and Partha describe the difficulty of evaluating 
scientific discoveries, a concept that transfers to inventions to some 
degree:  
                                                                                                     
approachability of patent law generally, see Janis & Holbrook, supra note 195. 
 250. Seymore, supra note 208, at 633; Mueller, supra note 213, at 503; Hilton 
Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(Nies, J., dissenting) (“We have made the infringement analysis so convoluted it 
is impossible for most district court judges untrained in ‘patentese’ to follow, much 
less jurors.”), rev’d, 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
 251. A term often shortened to “POSITA” or “PHOSITA.” For a discussion of 
the role of the PHOSITA in patent law doctrine, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885, 889  96 (2004) (discussing the role of PHOSITA in 
judicial decisions); Holbrook, supra note 249, at 781 (“In almost every area of 
patent law, the court or jury should view the issues from the perspective of the 
PHOSITA, not that of a lawyer or layperson.”); Greg Reilly, Rethinking the 
PHOSITA in Patent Litigation, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 501, 503 (2016) (“Decision 
makers must resolve many patent law issues from the perspective of a ‘person 
having ordinary skill in the art’ (‘PHOSITA’) (i.e., an average technical person in 
the relevant field).”). 
 252. See Holbrook, supra note 249, at 781 (“Consequently, the description in 
a patent need not include information already known by the PHOSITA, which 
permits applicants to submit simpler patent disclosures.”). 
 253. See Anderson, supra note 209 and accompanying text (describing the 
secrecy surrounding patent law). 
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For the public at large are incapable of screening scientists by 
their innate abilities, and they are equally incapable of 
evaluating the relative importance of scientific discoveries; not 
only does one scientist look much like another, one publication 
looks pretty much like another, as well! So scientists are 
themselves commodities of uncertain quality to the public, as 
are their past publications.254 
To be sure, it may be possible to appreciate and evaluate the 
quality of an invention when it is embodied in an artifact, such as 
an actual “beerbrella”255 or the USB port on a computer.256 And yet, 
how can the public know—from the existence of a physical 
artifact—that a particular individual invented it? Patents provide 
that evidence; more, they have historically provided a framework 
for contests between inventors in which other types of evidence can 
be weighed.257 It is difficult to assess whether an invention is truly 
“new.” Generally, an audience does not have days or weeks to 
assess whether someone really has an invention or not. The 
audience must necessarily rely on the credential—the patent—as 
the best source of information about whether a person making a 
claim to be an inventor really is one. 
V. Examples of Patents as Credentials 
This Part provides a few examples of credential uses of 
patents. A credential use is one where the abstraction of a patent 
plays an important role in communicating with an audience or 
making a determination.258 Each of these examples use the patent 
as credential in slightly different ways based on who the audience 
is. Together, they lend support to the conclusion that patents serve 
                                                                                                     
 254. Dasgupta Partha & Paul A. David, Toward a New Economics of Science, 
23 RES. POL’Y 487, 505 (1994).  
 255. U.S. Patent No. 6,637,447 (issued Oct. 19, 2001). 
 256. See Hubbard, supra note 14, at 385 (describing the Intel commercial 
about the co-inventor of the USB drive). 
 257. See Dane, supra note 104 and accompanying text (describing the 
post-Alice landscape of Federal Circuit jurisprudence and proposing possible 
improvements). 
 258. See supra Part III (describing patents as credentials). 
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as a credential for named inventors, whether as proof of inventive 
talent, technological skill, or qualification for a job.  
The examples we give are necessarily under inclusive; 
virtually every reader of drafts of this Article offered their own 
suggestions. One of the most powerful is that of Bob Kearns in 
John Seabrook’s 1993 New Yorker article, The Flash of Genius.259 
Seabrook describes Bob Kearns’s patenting of the intermittent 
windshield wiper and his efforts to enforce his patent against the 
giants of the automobile industry.260 Seabrook writes of that 
litigation:  
At a hearing in 1980, Kearns said, “I want you to understand 
that I am wearing a little badge here, and that badge says that 
I am an inventor, and it says I am a net contributor to society. 
And it is like maybe you can’t see the badge, and these other 
gentlemen can’t see the badge, and I don’t think anybody is 
going to be able to see the badge until my trial is finished in this 
courtroom and I will find out whether I am wearing the badge 
or not.”261 
Kearns’s quotation is revealing of an underlying theme: that many 
inventors view patents as more than the stark economic 
instrument they are legally meant to be.262 Rather, inventors view 
a patent as a strong symbol of inventor-status and as evidence of 
an underlying inventive quality. This status may manifest in 
monetary terms, such as in seeking employment, or in ways that 
cannot easily be quantified by money alone. The below examples 
illustrate both aspects of patents as credentials, recognizing also 
that they are often intertwined and not easily disentangled. 
A. Credential Uses of Patents in Universities 
Institutions of higher education frequently showcase their 
patents and named inventors. The University of Iowa Engineering 
department provides a prime example. A central feature of the 
                                                                                                     
 259. See Seabrook, supra note 196 (describing Seabrook’s journey to patent 
his invention of windshield wipers). 
 260. Id.  
 261. Id. 
 262.  See id.  
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engineering building is a large display of plaques representing the 
department’s many granted patents.263 Iowa Engineering is in 
good company: institutions of higher education across the country 
feature their issued patents in buildings and online.264 In addition 
to showcasing issued patents in prominent displays, many 
universities host annual award ceremonies where inventors are 
publicly recognized and given plaques.265 The practice of 
recognizing inventors identified by patents obtained suggests a 
                                                                                                     
 263. See picture on file with the authors. 
 264. See, e.g., Patent Wall of Fame, U. ALASKA ANCHORAGE, 
https://www.uaa.alaska.edu/research/office-of-research-and-graduate-studies/ 
office-of-research-technology-commercialization/patent_wall_of_fame.cshtml 
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Guide to Technology Transfer, N.C. A&T ST. U., 
http://www.ncat.edu/research/dored/tech-transfer-guide.html (last visited Feb. 
19, 2019) (featuring the University’s “Patent Gallery”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Faculty Patents, THAYER SCH. ENGINEERING 
DARTMOUTH, 
https://engineering.dartmouth.edu/research/entrepreneurship/patents (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2019) (featuring the school’s invention wall and listing patents 
held by faculty) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 265. See, e.g., 2016 Inventor Award Ceremony & Reception, U. TEX. AUSTIN, 
https://research.utexas.edu/otc/about-otc/programs-and-events/event-2016-
inventor-award-ceremony-and-reception (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (detailing the 
program for an annual event honoring university inventors granted U.S. Patents) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 2017 Patent Awards Ceremony 
Honorees, GEO. U., https://otc.georgetown.edu/pac2017awardees (last visited Feb. 
19, 2019) (listing inventors honored at the university’s annual patent awards) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Kevin Coss, Recognizing the U’s 
Most Entrepreneurial Innovators, U. MINN. (Mar. 29, 2017), 
https://research.umn.edu/inquiry/post/recognizing-u%E2%80%99s-most-
entrepreneurial-innovators (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (describing the University 
of Minnesota’s Inventor Recognition Event, recognizing 220 university inventors 
whose technology had been recently licensed or patented) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Jennifer Pittman, Campus Inventors 
Recognized for Recent Patents, U. CAL. SANTA CRUZ (Dec. 12, 2016), 
https://news.ucsc.edu/2016/12/inventor-recognition.html (last visited Feb. 19, 
2019) (spotlighting inventors within the university) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). For a general discussion of inventor recognition programs, 
see Inventor Recognition Programs an Effective Form of Internal Marketing, TECH 
TRANSFER CEN. (Aug. 31, 2011), http://techtransfercentral.com/2011/08/31/ 
inventor-recognition-programs-an-effective-form-of-internal-marketing-2 (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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credential use of the patent by the universities—one that has 
gradually shifted from distaste to desirability.266 
Patents are often features on the curriculum vitae of 
professors. A review of the websites of professors in the 
bioengineering department at the University of Iowa provides 
numerous examples of professors with issued or pending patent 
applications reflected on their curricula vitae.267 Those researchers 
are hardly exceptions. 
The concept of patents as credentials also provides a possible 
causal explanation for why, as empirical studies demonstrate, 
academic researchers believe that patents add to their 
reputation.268 Patents establish to the world that the academic is 
not just an academic—she is an inventor. Yet, there is also a 
complex relationship between academic “credit” for patents and 
other types of activities that a researcher might receive credit for, 
such as article citations or grants.269 In a Nature Immunology 
article written for academic researchers, for example, Janet Reed 
observes that while “publishing remains the investigator’s ‘bread 
and butter’ for academic recognition and career 
advancement . . . . there is a growing trend of recognizing patents 
                                                                                                     
 266. See Peter Lee, Patents and the University, 63 DUKE L.J. 1, 1013, 3639 
(2013) (“Early patent policies on the part of universities reveal a unique academic 
skepticism of patents.”). 
 267. See People, U. IOWA BIOMED. ENG’G, https://bme.engineering. 
uiowa.edu/people (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (listing faculty members with links 
to their biographies and curricula vitae) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 268. See Devrim Göktepe-Hultén, Inventing and Patenting Activities of 
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402 (2010) (proposing that scientists use patents and invention disclosures as 
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University Inventors in Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, 16 YALE 
J.L. & TECH 285, 316 (2014) (finding that 85% of respondents to a survey of 
computer science and electrical engineering professors do not rank patents among 
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 269. See Love, supra note 268. 
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as legitimate indicators of research success, especially in more 
entrepreneurial academic environments.”270 
B. Employer and Professional Uses of Patents as Credentials 
Employers across the country recognize the achievements of 
employees for a variety of activities. In certain industries, 
especially those with high pressure for innovation, companies host 
recognition ceremonies for named inventors on patents. One 
example is Vermeer, an industrial and agriculture equipment 
company headquartered in Pella, Iowa.271 The “Vermeer Inventor 
Club” was initiated in 1999 to recognize inventors at a time when 
the company was investing more in patented technology.272 
Vermeer hosts an annual event to recognize Inventor Club 
members. Each inventor receives a patent plaque, “modest cash 
stipend,” and a baseball hat embroidered with the inventor’s 
patent number(s).273 According to Robert R. Smith, Vice-President 
and General Counsel, the hat is the least costly but is perhaps the 
most valued premium offered to the inventors.274 Inventor Club 
members “often wear it during work and it can have the effect of 
elevating their status among their peers — particularly those with 
multiple patent numbers on the hat.”275 The hat’s ability to raise 
an engineer’s status among peers suggests a credential use in that 
the engineers recognize that a patent represents technological skill 
and innovative capacity. Additionally, the company, in recognizing 
                                                                                                     
 270. See Janet E. Reed, Publishing and Patenting the Fruits of Academic 
Research: The Key to a Successful Parallel Track, 14 NATURE IMMUNOLOGY 523, 
523 (2013) (discussing the commercialization of academic research); see also Lee, 
supra note 266, at 39–46 (describing the aggressive patent practices of research 
universities, notably their efforts to extend patent exclusivity to their professors’ 
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 272. Memorandum from Robert R. Smith, Vice-President & Gen. Counsel, 
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 274. Id. 
 275. Id.  
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inventors, is using the patent as a credential representing a certain 
level of contribution by an employee.  
Vermeer’s Inventor Club is one of a multitude of examples. 
Deere & Company, known for their tractors and other agricultural 
and construction equipment,276 celebrates inventors on patents 
with award ceremonies, plaques and other forms of peer 
recognition.277 Similarly, Rockwell Collins, an aviation and 
communication firm,278 views innovation as one of its core 
values.279 Nan Mattai, Rockwell’s Chief Technology Officer, stated 
that each inventor receives both “a monetary reward and a plaque 
for each invention, presented to them by their manager usually as 
part of a team celebration.”280 Microsoft gives out decorative black 
cubes to inventors when a patent application is filed and inventors 
display stacks of them as their “street cred.”281 One former 
employee commented that “I remember interviewing for a new 
position within Microsoft and feeling my hands sweat when I saw 
a stack of cubes behind my interrogator.”282 And Intellectual 
Ventures recently touted one of the individuals it works with, 
                                                                                                     
 276. See About Us, JOHN DEERE, https://www.deere.com/en/index.html (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2019) (“Since our founding in 1837, John Deere has delivered 
products and services to support those linked to the land.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 277. See Email from Joshua Heitsman, Senior IP Counsel, John Deere, to 
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 279. See Email from Donna Suchy, Managing Counsel IP, Rockwell Collins, 
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Lowell Wood, as America’s new “most prolific inventor.”283 Why? 
Because he now has more patents than Thomas Edison.284 
Outside of private industry, governmental departments 
engage in employee recognition for patents. For example, the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) hosted a patent award 
ceremony in 2015 where it recognized inventor “employees and 
other individuals who have been awarded patents by the U.S. 
Patent Office for their technology advancements and inventions 
contributing to the homeland security mission.”285 During the 
ceremony, DHS Under Secretary for Science and Technology Dr. 
Reginald Brothers said, “The technologies developed by our 
employees that culminate in patent awards are vitally important 
for the Department in attracting scientific talent . . . .”286 Brothers’ 
statement indicates that even the DHS relies in part on the 
credential value of patents to attract talented new employees. 
Parts of the military also acknowledge inventors with plaques 
and ceremonies. The U.S. Armament Research, Development and 
Engineering Center (ARDEC) honors inventors by placing an 
image of the patent on the “Innovation Wall of Fame” and giving 
them a trophy.287 And, the Naval Surface Warfare Center 
                                                                                                     
 283. See Nathan Myhrvold, Move Over, Thomas Edison. Lowell Wood is Now 
America’s Most Prolific Inventor, INTELL. VENTURES (Nov. 4, 2015), 
http://www.intellectualventures.com/insights/archives/move-over-thomas-
edison.-lowell-wood-is-now-americas-most-prolific-inventor (last visited Feb. 19, 
2019) (celebrating Wood’s 1,085th patent and noting that he “averages about one 
new U.S. patent granted every day of the week”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
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 285. See DHS Press Office, DHS Recognizes Innovators at Patent Award 
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Office of the General Counsel.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 286. Id. 
 287. See Audra Calloway, Picatinny Honors 11 Patent Holders During 
ARDEC Ceremony, U.S. ARMY (July 11, 2016), 
https://www.army.mil/article/171287/picatinny_honors_11_patent_holders_during
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Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) began hosting patent awards 
ceremonies in 2012.288 At the inaugural NSWCDD event, 
Catherine Donovan, Counsel to the Office of Naval Research, 
explained why the Navy seeks patents for inventions. Donovan 
said that one motivation was “[t]o attain international 
recognition . . . for the inventors of useful, novel, and non-obvious 
inventions.”289 This explanation strongly suggests that the Navy 
envisions a credential benefit to the inventors of Navy-owned 
patents. The patent provides an avenue for the Naval employee to 
evidence her prior inventive activities, even though the employee 
is unlikely to receive direct financial benefit from the invention.290  
A final example of a credential use of patents can be found in 
the way that some patent attorneys and patent agents highlight 
their own patents when advertising legal services. The websites of 
numerous patent professionals reflect that the attorney or agent 
holds his or her own patent.291 This use of a patent is meant to 
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patent applications where I am an inventor in process before the USPTO.”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); About Us, SEATTLE PATENT AGENT 
(2013), http://seattlepatentagent.com/about-3 (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (“Before 
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11 US patents.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); My 
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patentlaw.com/about_me (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (“I am an inventor in my own 
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reflect that the professional is knowledgeable about patents and 
invention, a credential use. Furthermore, at least one patent 
attorney sought and received a patent exclusively for a credential 
purpose. The “Beerbrella” is an umbrella-type device for use to 
shade a drink in the heat of summer.292 The inventor listed on the 
patent is a patent attorney who filed the patent for the purpose of 
obtaining an example of his work.293 Here, the actual use of the 
patent served primarily as a credential, albeit one that’s different 
than the pure inventorship credential. In this case, the patent 
stood as evidence of the attorney’s ability to write and receive a 
patent.294 
C. Patents as Credentials in Judicial Opinions 
One area where the reputational effects of patents as 
credentials is particularly salient is in the context of judicial 
opinions in actions to correct inventorship.295 While 35 U.S.C. 
§ 256 provides a mechanism for correction of inventorship on a 
patent by a court,296 a petitioner must still meet the Article III 
                                                                                                     
right, with 14 issued patents, one about to issue, and many more pending.”) (on 
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 295. See Faryniarz v. Ramirez, No. 3:13-CV-01064 (CSH), 2015 WL 6872439, 
at *17–18 (D. Conn. Nov. 9, 2015) (summarizing cases in which reputational 
injury was alleged in the context of seeking correction of inventorship on a 
patent). 
 296. See 35 U.S.C. § 256 (2012) (stating that if an inventor’s name is omitted 
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standing requirement.297 A direct ownership interest in the patent, 
or a pecuniary benefit that flows from being named an inventor 
can suffice;298 but the Federal Circuit has also recognized that a 
reputational injury alone from failing to be named as an inventor 
on a patent may be sufficient.299  
The Federal Circuit planted the seeds of reputational injury 
standing theory in its 2001 decision in Chou v. University of 
Chicago.300 The court wrote: 
Chou argues that a reputational interest alone is enough to 
satisfy the requirements of Article III standing. That assertion 
is not implausible. After all, being considered an inventor of 
important subject matter is a mark of success in one’s field, 
comparable to being an author of an important scientific paper. 
Pecuniary consequences may well flow from being designated 
as an inventor.301  
Standing was ultimately resolved on another ground: Chou, 
the court concluded, had a concrete financial interest in the 
patent.302  
In 2015, the Federal Circuit squarely addressed the issue in 
Shukh v. Seagate Technology, LLC,303 concluding that reputational 
                                                                                                     
from a patent, the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
may issue a certificate correcting the error). 
 297. See Fishel v. Mich. State Univ., No. 1:15-CV-50, 2016 WL 4006820, at *3 
(W.D. Mich. July 19, 2016), appeal dismissed, No. 2017-1007, 2017 WL 4541744 
(Fed. Cir. July 26, 2017) (“Even a party concerned who is clearly within the 
purview of § 256, however, must show that he has suffered an injury-in-fact, that 
the injury is traceable to the conduct complained of, and that the injury is 
redressable by a favorable decision.” (quoting Chou v. Univ. of Chi., 254 F.3d 
1347, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2001))). 
 298. See Chou v. Univ. of Chi., 254 F.3d 1347, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding 
concrete financial interest in a patent is enough to satisfy the three requirements 
for standing under Article III). 
 299. See Shukh v. Seagate Tech., LLC, 803 F.3d 659, 663 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(holding that “[a] concrete and particularized reputational injury can give rise to 
Article III standing” and remanding to determine whether the inventor suffered 
a reputational injury). 
 300. 254 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 301. Id. at 1359. 
 302. Id. 
 303. 803 F.3d 659 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
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injury alone can be sufficient to establish Article III standing.304 In 
concluding that reputational injury could be enough, the court 
directly considered whether the failure to be named as an inventor 
on the disputed patents harmed Dr. Shukh’s reputation as an 
inventor. Even though there was no dispute that “Dr. Shukh had 
a reputation as an excellent inventor,” this did not mean that “Dr. 
Shukh’s omission from the patents did not harm his reputation.”305 
Rather, “[t]he evidence supports the conclusion that Dr. Shukh’s 
reputation as an inventor would have been higher had he been 
named on the patents.”306 And ultimately, it was the effect on 
future employers that mattered, employers who would necessarily 
rely on the Dr. Shukh’s being named an inventor on the patent 
rather than first-hand knowledge of his work:  
Likewise, the testimony of Dr. Shukh’s coworkers that 
additional patents would not change their impression of Dr. 
Shukh’s technical abilities does not speak to whether additional 
patents would improve Dr. Shukh’s reputation in the eyes of 
potential employers. Dr. Shukh’s coworkers had years of 
experience working directly with Dr. Shukh, unlike potential 
employers, who likely lack that first-hand knowledge and are 
therefore more likely to rely on their knowledge of Dr. Shukh’s 
reputation in evaluating their impression of him.307 
In Shukh, the court may have allowed the reputational effect of 
being named an inventor to provide constitutional standing, but 
there was substantial and specific evidence for the court to draw 
on. A more recent case—albeit nonprecedential and involving 
pleading issues—involved a failure to establish sufficient 
reputational injury.308 Exactly how much of a direct reputational 
showing is necessary remains an open legal question, and one for 
future scholarship to explore. 
                                                                                                     
 304. See id. at 663 (“Today, we hold that concrete and particularized 
reputational injury can give rise to Article III standing.”). 
 305. Id. at 665. 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id.  
 308. See Huster v. j2 Cloud Services, Inc., 682 F. App’x 910, 916–19 (Fed. Cir. 
2017) (finding that a putative inventor that failed to provide any evidence of 
reputational injury in a correction-of-inventorship claim did not meet the injury 
requirement for Article III standing). 
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D. Government and Nonprofit Patent Awards 
Universities and employers are not alone in recognizing 
named inventors on issued patents. Several international, 
national, and local organizations recognize named inventors.  
Internationally, the European Inventor Awards hosted by the 
European Patent Office (EPO) recognize inventors in categories 
such as industry, research, and lifetime achievement.309 A key 
requirement for a nominee to qualify for award consideration is an 
issued European Patent.310 The patent functions as a credential 
because the EPO relies on the underlying decision to issue a patent 
to support the conclusion that the inventor created new and 
innovative technology.311 
A similar honor exists in the United States: the National 
Inventor’s Hall of Fame.312 Induction into the Hall of Fame 
requires a United States patent that has contributed significantly 
to the nation’s welfare and the advancement of science and useful 
arts.313 Although the National Inventors Hall of Fame is an 
independent nonprofit, it is sponsored by the United States Patent 
                                                                                                     
 309. See European Inventor Award Categories, EUR. PAT. OFF., 
https://www.epo.org/learning-events/european-inventor/about/categories.html 
(last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (listing the European Inventor Award’s five categories) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 310. See Entry Forms for the European Inventor Award 2016 (2016) (“If you 
do not specify a European patent for your chosen inventor, and we cannot identify 
one after doing our own research, your entry will be eliminated from the 
competition.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 311. See About the Award, EUR. PAT. OFF., https://www.epo.org/learning-
events/european-inventor/about.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (stating that the 
award recognizes innovation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
Admittedly the EPO has some interest in promoting the value of receiving a 
patent, but this self-interested purpose does not negate the use of a patent as a 
credential. Id. 
 312. See NATIONAL INVENTORS HALL OF FAME 1, https://www.invent.org/sites/ 
default/files/file-upload/2018-10/2019_Company_Overview_Compressed.pdf 
(describing its mission as “paying forward America’s rich history of invention and 
securing our country’s competitive advantage for the future”). 
 313. See Nominate the Next Great Inventor for Our Hall of Fame, NAT’L 
INVENTORS HALL FAME, http://www.invent.org/honor/inductees/nominate-an-
inventor (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (describing the nomination process) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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Office, and is housed in the Patent Office headquarters in 
Alexandria, Virginia.314  
Numerous organizations at the state and local level recognize 
“inventors”—by which they mean, inventors named on a 
patent— a s well. The Edison Patent Award, for example, is 
sponsored by the Research & Development Council of New 
Jersey.315 This award recognizes the named inventors on patents 
covering technology developed, at least in part, in New Jersey.316 
In most cases, the inventors recognized with the Edison Patent 
Award do not have any ownership right in the patent because they 
are employees of large companies.317 Using a patent as criteria for 
recognizing inventors at large companies represents a credential 
use of the patent, serving as an indicator of underlying innovative 
characteristics not readily discerned in a different way.318 The 
Florida Inventors Hall of Fame “honors and celebrates those 
inventors whose achievements have advanced the quality of life for 
Floridians, our state and our nation.”319 A requirement for being 
                                                                                                     
 314. See Our Museum is a National Monument to Innovation, NAT’L 
INVENTORS HALL OF FAME, http://www.invent.org/honor/hall-of-fame-museum 
(last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (noting the Museum is located at 600 Dulany Street, 
which is also the address of the Patent and Trademark Office) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 315. See EDISON PATENT AWARD 2018 SUBMISSION GUIDELINES, RESEARCH & 
DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL OF NEW JERSEY 2 (2018), http://www.rdnj.org/news/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/2018-Edison-Patent-Award-Nomination-Form.pdf 
(listing award criteria). 
 316. See id. (“[The] [p]atent must have at least part of the technical [or] 
scientific work that comprises the patent . . . done in New Jersey and submitter 
must be able to substantiate this.”).  
 317. For examples of award winners, see, e.g., RDCouncilNJ, 2014 Edison 
Patent Award Honeywell Tribute Film, YOUTUBE (Nov. 14, 2014), 
https://youtu.be/ci8KcN9LcV4 (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (listing Honeywell 
employees) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); RDCouncilNJ, 
2014 Edison Patent Award Winner Colgate-Palmolive Tribute Film, YOUTUBE 
(Nov. 18, 2014), https://youtu.be/uQkK32PJkA0 (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) 
(showing Colgate employees) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
RDCouncilNJ, 2011 R&D Council of NJ Bristol-Myers Squibb Edison Patent 
Award Film, YOUTUBE (Nov. 30, 2011), https://youtu.be/DWoZsKafMDQ (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2019) (listing Bristol-Myers Squibb employees) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 318. See supra Part V.B (examining employer and professional uses of patents 
as credentials). 
 319. See generally About the Hall of Fame, FLA. INVENTORS HALL FAME (2019), 
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recognized? “Must be a named inventor on a patent issued by the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office.”320 The $500,000 
Lemelson-MIT Prize is awarded to mid-career inventors who must 
“be the primary inventor of two or more granted U.S. patents, one 
of which is a product or process that has been commercialized or 
has potential or realized adoption.”321 
Intellectual property lawyer associations, too, recognize 
inventors. Examples include the New York Intellectual Property 
Law Association’s “Inventor of the Year Award322 and the Houston 
Intellectual Property Law Association.323 Both organizations 
require that nominees must have received one or more U.S. 
patents to be eligible.324 
Social organizations, too, may require patents for 
membership. The National Academy of Inventors, “with over 4,000 
individual inventor members and Fellows spanning more than 250 
institutions worldwide” states that “to join your university or 
non-profit research institute’s chapter, you must be a member of 
your institution’s academic community . . . and have a patent 
issued from the USPTO.”325 
                                                                                                     
http://www.floridainvents.org/about (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (describing the 
Hall of Fame as a state-wide initiative that encourages Floridian innovation) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 320. See Nominate, FLA. INVENTORS HALL FAME (2019), 
http://www.floridainvents.org/nominate (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (listing award 
criteria) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 321. See Lemelson-MIT Prize, Eligibility Requirements, LEMELSON-MIT, 
http://lemelson.mit.edu/prize (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (listing requirements) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 322. See Inventor of the Year (IOTY) Award, N.Y. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, 
https://www.nyipla.org/nyipla/InventorOfTheYear.asp (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) 
(“In order to be eligible for the Award, nominees must have received one or more 
U.S. patents for [their] invention(s) contributing to modern society.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 323. See Inventor of the Year, HOUS. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, 
https://hipla.org/Inventor-of-the-Year (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (calling for 
nominations) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 324. See supra notes 322–23 (detailing the eligibility criteria of both awards). 
 325. See About Us, NAT’L ACAD. INVENTORS (2019), 
http://www.academyofinventors.org/about.asp (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) 
(describing membership requirements) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
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E. Capitalizing on the Credential Value of Patents 
A final piece of evidence supporting the idea of patents as 
credentials is the “patent award” industry.326 A search for 
purveyors of patent plaques and frames revealed at least five 
companies engaged in the business.327 These companies’ models 
depend on inventors and companies valuing a patent as an award 
or achievement, similar to a college degree, worthy of a place on a 
wall.328 At least one inventor, Jeff Greenhalgh, made the 
connection between a patent and being officially recognized as an 
“inventor” upon receipt of a certificate from a patent plaque 
company.329 Recognizing oneself as inventor only after receiving a 
patent and a plaque tends to support the credentialing effect of a 
patent. 
                                                                                                     
 326. See Hubbard, supra note 14 (describing the patent plaque industry). 
 327. See, e.g., Patent Plaques by IPIax, IPLAX PAT. PLAQUES (2018), 
https://iplax.com (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (presenting Wilmington, North 
Carolina-based patent plaque manufacturer) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); PAT. AWARDS (2019), http://www.patentawards.com (last visited 
Feb. 19, 2019) (presenting Warsaw, Indiana-based patent plaque manufacturer) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); U.S. PAT. CERTIFICATE (2019), 
https://uspc.com (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (presenting Ft. Myers, Florida-based 
professional awards manufacturer) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); U.S. PAT. SERVS., INC. (2016), http://recognizinginnovation.com (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2019) (presenting Grafton, Wisconsin-based patent award 
manufacturer) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); PATS. AS ART 
(2017), http://www.patentframe.com (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (presenting Little 
Rock, Arkansas-based patent framers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 328. See Matthew Knell, By Watson, I Am an Inventor!, TAGSMITH.ORG (Aug. 
3, 2010), http://www.tagsmith.org/2010/08/03/by-watson-i-am-an-inventor (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2019) (recounting the story of an inventor who did not know his 
patent had been accepted and granted until he received a piece of “spam” mail 
from “the ‘Official Patent Certificate’ company,” which offers to frame certificates 
of recently-granted patents) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
A blog post by Matthew Knell makes it seem as if patent framing companies 
actively pursue individuals recently named on patents. Id.  
 329. See JEFF GREENHALGH, SO, YOU HAVE A GREAT IDEA 9 (2011) 
When I ordered the plaque of my first patent, as a reproduction of the 
original patent provided me by the United States Patent Office, the 
plaque company also included a formal certificate that says “Inventor,” 
with my name and patent number on it. If the United States Patent 
Office formally recognizes me as an Inventor, then yes, I am an 
inventor. 
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No single piece of anecdotal evidence can conclusively support 
the theory that patents function as credentials in society. Indeed, 
we hope this Article sparks interest in empirical research into the 
credentialing function of patents. But, the present accumulation of 
these examples of credential-type uses of patents in multiple 
sectors of public and private life strongly indicate that patents 
serve as socially acknowledged credentials. The strength of a 
patent as a credential, as with any credential, is likely to vary 
depending on the nature of the audience, but it seems that patents 
are widely accepted across a broad array of audiences, perhaps 
more readily transferable than many other types of credentials.  
VI. A Normative Assessment of Patents as Credentials 
Patents are widely used as credentials—that much seems 
clear. But is that a good thing? The sociological literature on 
academic credentials argues, almost uniformly, that credentials 
are normatively bad.330 But that sociological thesis is itself 
counterculture, and is set against a backdrop of a society that takes 
credentials’ value for granted.331 Given this context, it is important 
to examine both sides: the positives and negatives of patents as 
credentials.  
A. The Purpose of Credentials 
A normative assessment of patents as credentials cannot begin 
without thinking about the purposes that the credentialing 
function of patents might serve. As noted at the outset, a common 
function of credentials is to distill and abstract a characteristic or 
                                                                                                     
 330. See, e.g., Brown & Bills, supra note 49, at 137 (describing “credentialing” 
as “a mere defensive necessity for holding mediocre . . . positions in [weak] labor 
markets,” noting for example the sharp increase in degree-seekers after the 2008 
recession). 
 331. See Kim A. Weeden, Why Do Some Occupations Pay More than Others? 
Social Closure and Earnings Inequality in the United States, 108 AM. J. 
SOCIOLOGY 55, 55–58 (2002) (describing credentialism—the increasing 
requirement for formal qualifications such as “licensing, educational 
credentialing, voluntary certification, association representation, and 
unionization” —as a barrier to entry in many occupations). 
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attribute possessed by the bearer into a form that is more easily 
understood and processed.332 In other words, a credential provides 
information about a difficult to observe aspect of the bearer. Often, 
this information is being provided to a third party decisionmaker 
ex ante, prior to a decision that will have consequences in the 
future.333  
We see this distillation as having two effects. The first is what 
we refer to as the “economic” effect, in which the formalized 
abstraction of a patent can be translated into monetary benefit. A 
typical example is a hiring decision. Employers must typically 
make decisions about whether or not a potential employee 
possesses certain characteristics before having an opportunity to 
observe the potential new hire in practice. Perhaps the new 
employee will have the desired characteristics, such as high 
productivity, but perhaps not. Credentials function as a way for 
employers to mitigate the risk of hiring an employee who lacks the 
desired characteristics because they provide the employer with 
information about the employee.334  
The second effect of the credential is as a mechanism of 
self-worth for the bearer. As shorthand, we refer this concept as 
the “self-worth” effect and recognize that it can take two forms: 
self-validation and approbation.335 Self-validation refers to the 
                                                                                                     
 332.  See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 630 (2002) 
(showing that observers may use patent documents, as well as patent portfolios, 
to deduce information about patentees). 
 333.  Id. at 659. 
 334. See BILLS, supra note 49, at 47–60 (demonstrating how the use of 
educational credentials as a shorthand for applicant qualification results in 
over-qualification and the perpetuation of inequality). 
 335. Although there are some threads connecting the “self-worth” effect of a 
credential and theories based on personhood, the two are distinct concepts. See 
Margaret Jane Radin, Property as Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 958 (1982) 
(exploring the relationship between property rights and personal development). 
“Personhood”-based theories, which draw upon Margaret Jane Radin’s seminal 
work Property as Personhood, approach intellectual property from the perspective 
of the degree to which a creative intangible reflects a person’s personality. See id. 
(explaining that the “personhood perspective” corresponds to the personality 
theory of property)’ see also Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and 
Inventors in Intellectual Property, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81, 87 (1998) 
(applying the personhood perspective to intellectual property). “Self-worth” draws 
upon the effect that self-validation and external recognition has on the individual. 
Id.  
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effect of overcoming a challenge external to the self. Perhaps that 
challenge is obtaining a college degree or completing a marathon. 
Whatever the challenge, completing it adds to one’s sense of 
self-worth. Approbation is the innate desire for external validation 
and recognition from others.336  
The degree to which external validation is normatively 
desirable is too fundamental a question to address in this 
Article.337 Instead, we take it as a given that human beings desire 
to realize their potential and that one component of that 
self-realization is achieving validation from others. The question 
then simply becomes whether or not patents effectively provide 
such a challenge or offer meaningful external validation. 
B. The Case for Patents as Credentials 
Patents seem to fit the economic purpose of credentials fairly 
well. As described above, a patent can function as a signal that the 
person named as an inventor possesses inventive capabilities, such 
as an ability to innovate, or as a filter for those with those 
attributes.338 A patent can also function as an indicator that the 
person named on the patent is someone who is willing to 
participate in the patenting process—potentially a desirable 
characteristic for an employer that seeks to maximize its own 
patent portfolio. In these ways, patents can provide information to 
                                                                                                     
 336. See SMITH, supra note 36 (proposing that the desire to better one’s 
individual condition inadvertently improves society as a whole). See also Maria 
Pia Piaganelli, Approbation and the Desire to Better One’s Condition in Adam 
Smith: When the Desire to Better One’s Condition Does not Better One’s Condition 
and Society’s Condition, in HUMANISM AND RELIGION IN THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC 
THOUGHT: SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE TENTH AISPE CONFERENCE 59–77 (Daniela 
Fernanda Parisi & Stefano Solari eds., Franco Angeli 2010) (describing Adam 
Smith’s approbation-based approach in the WEALTH OF NATIONS and MORAL 
SENTIMENTS). 
 337. As an example of the depth of this topic, an entire psychological 
literature addresses the relationship between external mechanisms and 
self-esteem. See, e.g., Jeff Greenberg, Tom Pyszcynski, & Susan Solomon, The 
Causes and Consequences of a Need for Self-Esteem: A Terror Management 
Theory, in PUBLIC SELF AND PRIVATE SELF 189–212 (1986) (discussing ways in 
which people try to attain and maintain a favorable self-image). 
 338. See supra Part IV.B.2.b (stating that patents signify desirable qualities). 
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third parties, such as employers, about desirable characteristics 
that the third party will only be able to directly observe after an 
initial decision is made.  
Indeed, unlike many other credentials, patents convey more 
than information about characteristics that are difficult to observe 
ex ante. They also serve to compress and distill information about 
events in the past into a form that has greater meaning to others. 
Specifically, they communicate the inventive activities of the 
person named as an inventor. Exactly what the inventor did in the 
past is difficult to observe; although that difficulty is different than 
an inability to predict the future. Rather, the past can be difficult 
to see into due to a lack of record evidence, different lenses worn 
by the observer, and more. While an inventor’s activities may be 
memorialized in notebooks and other writings,339 those materials 
often will not be publicly accessible, and even if they are may be 
difficult to comprehend.340 
Patents can provide a single, public summary of what an 
inventor actually did in the past. In this way, patents do not simply 
provide information about a named inventor that is difficult to 
observe ex ante; they also provide a concise, memorialized ex post 
summary of what the inventor has done.341 Just as patents codify 
knowledge in a multitude of ways,342 patents also codify the state 
of an inventor at the time of filing by providing an evidentiary 
record of what existed at that time.  
                                                                                                     
 339. See Tamara Monosoff, Keeping an Inventor’s Notebook, ENTREPRENEUR 
(June 12, 2006), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/159556 (last visited Feb. 
19, 2019) (advising that a dated inventor’s notebook acts as a record for the 
USPTO to validate one’s inventive progress in case of a patent dispute) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 340.  Id. (explaining that inventor’s notebooks are highly personalized). 
 341. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012) (stating that a patent must contain a “written 
description” of (1) the invention and (2) the manner and process of making and 
using the invention). Indeed, within patent law there are formal doctrines that 
explicitly draw on the idea that what an inventor is entitled to claim exclusive 
rights over is based on what the inventor actually contributed at the time of filing 
as reflected in the patent application itself. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & 
Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (describing the written description 
doctrine and stating that a patent application must objectively demonstrate that 
the applicant actually invented the claimed subject matter). 
 342. See generally Burk, supra note 210 (explaining that patents codify and 
commodify tacit or industry knowledge). 
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Patents can also satisfy the human desire for self-worth. They 
represent an external challenge to be overcome, one that can only 
be met by creating an invention. Meeting that challenge, as proven 
to one’s self by receiving a patent, can enhance one’s sense of 
self-worth.343 Patents can also offer a measure of approbation in 
the form of the Patent Office’s recognition of the achievement of 
invention as well as the subsequent recognition by others.344  
Importantly, the meaningfulness of external validation 
requires both recognition and accuracy. If the external validation 
is given out to all, like a participation trophy, then it is also of little 
value as a form of external recognition. Thus, the extent to which 
patents function as a mechanism of external validation depends in 
large part on what the audience believes about patents.345 
In answering questions about the normative value of patents 
as credentials under both an economic and self-worth approach, 
some of the benefits of patents seem reasonably clear. For example, 
if society correctly values practical innovation as a social 
good— and that is a wholly different inquiry that we are willing to 
answer in the affirmative for purposes of this assessment — then 
the information provided by a patent seems to be reasonably 
useful.346 It is not perfect, but given the relative rigor of the 
examination process, the height of the bar to achieve the 
credential, and the legitimacy of the issuer, it is probably better 
than many other credentials at providing evidence for the 
characteristic for which it stands.347 In this sense, patent 
credentials may be valuable because they both recognize those 
                                                                                                     
 343. See SILBEY, supra note 10, at 156–57 (discussing how creators of patents 
can view their creation as their “baby”); Fromer, supra note 12, at 548 (describing 
how patents encourage people to invent). 
 344. See id. at 313 n.6 (describing the growing body of research which 
demonstrates the importance to creators that they receive recognition for their 
work). 
 345.  See id. at 150. 
 346.  See Fromer, supra note 12, at 553 n.69 (describing the social value of 
patent law). 
 347.  See Brown & Bills, supra note 49, at 136–37 (discussing some of the 
criticisms of the current credentialing regime).  
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individuals who have created an invention and identify to future 
employers or investors those persons with inventive capabilities.348  
The credentialing function of patents may be more important 
than ever before in today’s world where facts seem fluid and 
everything is open to debate.349 Everyone thinks they are an 
expert, regardless of any actual expertise.350 The credentialing 
function of patents offers one way out of this morass. It illustrates 
how society can actually rely on the determinations of experts, 
while at the same time maintaining a basic understanding of the 
relatively simple core elements that analysis revolves around.351 
We can’t all be experts in everything. But society can know just 
enough about something to let the experts examine the details—at 
least when it trusts the examiners.  
C. Limitations and Costs of Patents as Credentials 
Most of the literature on credentials, however, does not take a 
laudatory approach.352 Indeed, two leading scholars of educational 
credentials observe that “[o]ne sure route to infamy among 
academic analysts of credentials and perhaps even in spheres of 
judgment beyond these would be to write a piece extolling the 
virtues of credentials.”353 Instead, “explicit public discourse about 
the topic focuses on the gnarly underside of credential malfeasance 
and system failure.”354 Although it is important that examination 
of patents as credentials not focus wholly on the “gnarly 
                                                                                                     
 348.  See SILBEY, supra note 10, at 182–83 (describing the multitude of ways 
in which the reputational protection aspect of a patent benefits creators). 
 349. See id. at 149 (describing how the internet and social media has made 
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 350. See Lisa Guernsey, Suddenly, Everybody’s an Expert, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 
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an-expert.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (describing how the internet 
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Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 351.  See Hubbard, supra note 14, at 400 (describing how patents can inform 
laypeople of the ideas of inventors). 
 352. See Brown & Bills, supra note 49, at 136 (describing how academia looks 
down upon the credentialing process). 
 353. Id.  
 354. Id. 
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underside”  — there is dirt under every rock, after all — it is equally 
important to seriously consider the negative, and perhaps outright 
unsavory, consequences of patents as credentials.355 The following 
discussion identifies these concerns, allowing future work to 
examine them more closely. 
1. Patent Law’s Imperfections 
Patents are necessarily abstractions of what an inventor has 
actually done. Judge Alan Lourie recognized this point in Ariad 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.356—a seminal decision 
setting out the boundaries of the written description doctrine, a 
critical limitation on the permissible scope of patent claims—when 
he wrote that the doctrine was based on only “possession as shown 
in the disclosure” rather than encompassing what else was (or 
might have been) known to the inventor at the time of the 
application.357 As abstractions, they necessarily omit detail, and 
this can lead to skepticism.358 
In any event, it is well recognized that decisions of the Patent 
Office are not perfect.359 Examiners make mistakes; they have too 
little time to do a perfect job (if a perfect job is even possible).360 
Patentability decisions are necessarily made against the backdrop 
of limited information, thus leading to errors when compared 
                                                                                                     
 355. See id. (describing the “gnarly underside” of the current credentialing 
environment). 
 356. 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).  
 357. See id. at 1351 (discussing how patents must be able to inform one of how 
to recreate an invention). 
 358. See Brown & Bills, supra note 49, at 136 (“[C]redentials are explicit 
abstractions from substantive realities — they represent something else, and this 
fact undoubtedly is a prime source of recurring historical skepticism about 
them.”). 
 359. Patent office imperfection led one scholar to write an article arguing that 
such error is rational. See Lemley, supra note 245, at 1511 (“We understand 
rational ignorance on the part of the PTO, in other words-the only question is how 
much time we should spend per patent.”). 
 360. See, e.g., Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time 
Allocated to Review Patent Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid 
Patents?: Evidence from Micro-Level Application Data, 99 REV. ECON. & 
STATISTICS 550, 552 (2017) (“On average, a U.S. patent examiner spends only 
nineteen hours reviewing an application.”). 
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against the world as a whole.361 Indeed, just because a patent is 
strong evidence of invention does not mean that only those who are 
named on patents are inventors, or that it is conclusive evidence of 
invention.362 Strong evidence, yes, but as the legal mechanism of 
patents indicates, they are presumed valid but are not dispositive 
evidence of validity.363  
2. Overreliance on the Credential 
Another concern is that of overreliance on the credential. 
Commentators often deride professional and occupational 
licensing for imposing unnecessary costs.364 While patents don’t 
rise to the same level—despite the examples above, one doesn’t 
need a patent to start inventing—similar concerns about the 
overreliance on patents as credentials invite scrutiny.365 
Inventors may not obtain a patent for a variety of reasons: 
they may discover something but not turn their discovery into an 
invention; they may lack the financial resources to file for a patent; 
they may have conceived of innovative creative expression but not 
patentable subject matter.366 While substantive requirements to 
                                                                                                     
 361. See supra Part III.A.1 (describing the imperfections of the patent system 
as it relates to inventions).  
 362. See, e.g., Sherkow, supra note 226, at 1050 (describing the difficulties in 
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inventing process—and maybe not at all.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 366.  See When You Should Not File a Patent, PATENTFILE, 
https://patentfile.org/when-you-should-not-file-a-patent/, (last visited Feb. 19, 
2019) (listing “[u]npatentable [s]ubject [m]atter,” “[t]he invention is not new or it 
is obvious,” wanting to keep an invention secret, and not having a plan as reasons 
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obtain a patent can address some of these concerns by defining 
what is and is not an “invention” in the first place, not all 
inventions are patented.367 Jonas Salk invented the polio vaccine, 
but it was never patented.368 When asked who owned the patent 
he famously replied “[w]ell, the people I would say. There is no 
patent. Could you patent the sun?”369 Multiple explanations have 
been offered for the failure to patent Salk’s polio vaccine: inability 
to obtain a patent, Salk’s ethical stance, and the public-interest 
nature of the organization funding the vaccine research.370 But in 
the end, Salk’s vaccine — something that society could easily view 
as an “invention”  — did not lead to a patent.371  
Ultimately, a patent, as with other credentials, is just an 
indicator. It is not dispositive proof either that someone is or is not 
an inventor; although that answer is complicated to the extent that 
inventions are defined by patents.372 This is in line with how 
patents function as a legal mechanism.373 They come imbued with 
a presumption of validity and are prima facie evidence of validity, 
but they are not dispositive evidence of validity or ownership.374 At 
the same time, the power of patents raises a somewhat troubling 
question: can one be an inventor without a patent, at least in 
society’s eyes? Or is the presence of a patent necessary in order for 
one to be called an inventor? Hedy Lamarr is recognized as an 
                                                                                                     
inventors should not seek a patent) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 367. See JANE S. SMITH, PATENTING THE SUN: POLIO AND THE SALK VACCINE 338 
(1990) (pointing out that Jonas Salk never patented the Polio vaccine). 
 368. See id. (explaining why Jonas Salk never patented the Polio vaccine). 
 369. Id. 
 370. See Brian Palmer, Jonas Salk: Good at Virology, Bad at Economics, 
SLATE (Apr. 13, 2014, 9:21 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/history_of_innovation/2014/04/ 
the_real_reasons_jonas_salk_didn_t_patent_the_polio_vaccine.html (last visited 
Feb. 19, 2019) (pointing out that financial incentives drive innovation, and 
therefore vaccines should be patented, even though Salk did not patent the polio 
vaccine) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 371. SMITH, supra note 367, at 338. 
 372. See Flick, supra note 365 (emphasizing that one does not need a patent 
to be an inventor). 
 373. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012) (noting that patents receive a presumption of 
validity). 
 374. See id. (stating that “[a] patent shall be presumed valid” but allowing 
challenges against such validity). 
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inventor for her pioneering work on spread spectrum technology, 
but would she be seen an inventor if not for being named on Patent 
No. 2,229,287? 375 The answer to that question informs the deeper 
question of whether one is an inventor if one doesn’t have a patent. 
A related concern is that the incentive offered by a patent as a 
credential may result in the undervaluing of other types of 
inventive behavior that don’t lead to patented technologies.376 And 
it may overvalue other work — particularly “inventions” that differ 
only incrementally from what already exists and, in fact, lack more 
utility than the current state of the art.377 To the extent that 
patents function as credentials, the result would be the use of this 
social capital to subsidize socially redundant work as the expense 
of other areas of technology, such as basic science, software and 
user innovations that cannot be rewarded with a patent.378  
3. Mistaken Understandings of the Meaning of the Credential 
A related concern is that of mistaken understandings of the 
meaning of the credential, especially by those who have obtained 
it. A patent is—at most—an indicator that an individual has 
conceived of a new and useful invention; it is very clearly not 
evidence of the economic value of the invention.379 Craig Nard 
writes “the patent system neither guides inventors as to where 
they should channel their inventive energies, nor guarantees 
commercial success; rather, it is the marketplace that signals to 
                                                                                                     
 375. See Hedy Lamarr, FAMOUS WOMEN INVENTORS, http://www.women-
inventors.com/Hedy-Lammar.asp (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (stating that Hedy 
Lamarr “became a pioneer in the field of wireless communications”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 376. Thanks to Peter Lee for this suggestion. See A.B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, 
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 377. See id. (“While prizes may be an effective mechanism for drawing forth 
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 378. See id. at 201 – 03 (describing the current patent regime’s inability to 
successfully incentivize software innovation). 
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inventors where the financial rewards reside, and the costs and 
benefits of a given research project.”380 Similarly, the authors of IP 
and Antitrust write that an intellectual property right “is not even 
a guarantee of market success. Many patented inventions are not 
ever brought to market, and many published books never get 
beyond their first printing.”381 The Federal Trade Commission 
cautions that “although a patent can provide valuable protection 
for a successful invention, getting a patent doesn’t necessarily 
increase the changes of commercial success.”382 And David 
Pressman’s Patent It Yourself, includes an entire section on the 
need to conduct a commercial assessment of your invention.383 He 
warns against the common misconception that “[a]nyone who gets 
a patent will be assured of fame and fortune.”384 Nor does a patent’s 
newness mean that it is necessarily superior to what already 
exists.385 Pressman again cautions that “[a]lthough Madison 
Avenue would like you to believe this, in reality a patent merely 
means the invention is significantly different, not necessarily 
superior.”386  
One particular concern that mistakes about the meaning of a 
patent brings is the opportunity for exploitation of those who 
misunderstand what a patent means.387 “Invention promotion 
scams” are a particularly pernicious species.388 In these scams, an 
inventor is sucked in through late night television or other 
advertisements that tout the wonders of a patent and offer a free 
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 381. HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 4.02[A] (2017). 
 382. Invention Promotion Firms, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Sept. 2011), 
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0184-invention-promotion-firms (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 383. See PRESSMAN, supra note 137, at 16, 80 – 94 (noting how inventors should 
consider the economic realities of patent law). 
 384. Id. at 82.  
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inventor’s kit; ultimately, the result may be thousands or tens of 
thousands of dollars lost.389 Many such scams have been targeted 
by governmental entities tasked with investigating unfair 
business practices. The Federal Trade Commission provides a 
warning about “unscrupulous promoters” who “take advantage of 
an inventor’s enthusiasm for a new product or service.”390 “They 
not only urge inventors to patent their ideas or invention, but they 
also make false and exaggerated claims about the market potential 
of the invention.”391 IPWatchdog offers similar warnings, with a 
host of examples.392 And the Patent Office itself hosts a scam 
prevention page focused on invention promoters and promotion 
forums.393 The number and strengths of such cautions—and the 
stories of those who have been scammed—indicate that mistaken 
understandings of the meanings of a patent—that it is a sure-win 
get-rich ticket—are real.394  
4. Patents and Equality 
The conventional story of patents often features a 
Schumpeterian narrative, in which patents allow new firms to 
challenge existing capital.395 Viewed on the level of the individual, 
patents as credentials might operate this way as well. If anyone 
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PATENTS AS CREDENTIALS 389 
who created an invention can walk into the Patent Office and get 
a patent, then patents as credential offer an opportunity for social 
movement — Jacksonian equality for all. At the same time, broader 
social control over access to patents may control and limit those 
who might be called an inventor.396  
Consider the situation of inventors who are not white males. 
Women have long been allowed to receive patents, but property 
laws limiting women’s property rights into the early 1900s stymied 
the practice.397 Many fewer women than men—by orders of 
magnitude—obtained patents.398 During this time, when men 
dominated the Patent Office, a few women utilized the patent 
system to establish that they were, in fact, the inventors of a 
specific invention.399 But this practice was the exception, not the 
norm, and the extraordinary challenges faced by women in the 
Patent Offices highlight the divide further.400 Of course, the 
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challenge is separating out access to the patent system from 
underlying social and cultural constraints on invention.401 The 
relationship, though, creates a potential feedback loop: limited 
opportunities to access the patent system may lead to lower 
numbers of patents, which in turn may lead to the lack of patents 
being used as a false justification for a lack of natural ability, 
which in turn may lead to fewer resources, and hence fewer 
opportunities.402  
African-American inventors, too, have long been allowed to 
receive patents, assuming they met the patentability requirements 
and excluding a short period following the Dred Scott decision.403 
But practical (and at times, formal) limitations on 
African-American inventors’ ability to receive 
patents —  particularly while enslaved — meant that there were few 
such inventors.404  
Another narrative suggests the opposite: that patents 
provided a wedge for historically disadvantaged groups to 
challenge the status quo; to prove that they were the equals of the 
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dominant social group.405 Kara Swanson’s current work draws 
upon the idea that patents were deployed as the tip of the wedge 
that allowed white women and African-American men to advance 
their own social causes.406 In this way, the formalized abstraction 
of a patent allowed an entire social group to share in the observable 
contributions of its members.407  
VII. Concluding Thoughts 
A question left open by this Article is the degree to which law 
has shaped the meaning of the credential, or the meaning of the 
credential has shaped the law. We see good arguments in both 
directions. On the one hand, the disputes and requirements of 
patent law have necessarily provided the structure for 
constructing narratives about what a patent means; on the other 
hand, patent law itself reflects social norms about the good and 
worthwhile.408 Our society happens to value practical innovation; 
not all societies do. 
Yet, the role of law in defining the patent as a credential 
should not be ignored, nor its consequences dismissed. In the same 
way that Congress and the courts shaped society’s view of patents 
in the nineteenth century, legislative changes to the patent law 
and judicial decisions will shape patents’ function as credentials in 
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the future. If we are right that patents serve as reasonably good 
proxies for the human characteristic of “inventor,” and that 
individuals seek patents for this reason, we should take this 
function of patents into account. On balance, the exclusionary 
function of patents will necessarily weigh heavily — and perhaps 
commandingly so — but a focus on the exclusionary function alone 
ignores the organicism and complexity of the real world.  
In particular, changes to the law that take the human element 
out of patents are at odds with the role of patents as important 
credentials.409 For example, the 2011 America Invents Act made it 
easier for assignees — typically employers — to file in the name of 
the inventor.410 Employee-inventors now have even less mandatory 
involvement with the patenting process than they had before, 
further eroding the relationship between the individual inventor 
and the patent.411 The America Invents Act also made it easier to 
“correct” named inventors.412 Whereas the law prior to the America 
Invents Act required the petitioner to declare that the mistake had 
been made “without deceptive intent,” the post-America Invents 
Act law eliminates that requirement.413 Yes, firms’ patenting 
decisions are typically made by business interests and legal 
departments.414 But, these legal changes perpetuate a long-term 
trend in American patent law away from the human-as-inventor 
and toward the business-as-inventor.415  
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These changes are arguably undesirable, particularly if one 
accepts the idea that patents are not merely credentials, but 
especially important credentials for society to offer to those who 
meet their requirements.416 This position is even stronger when 
the exclusionary function of patents is not involved.417 To be sure, 
it may be more efficient to take humans out of the picture 
altogether, but whether that outcome is normatively good (for 
human beings, at least) is questionable.418  
At the same time, there is some movement in the opposite 
direction. The Federal Circuit’s holding in Shukh v. Seagate 
Technology, LLC,419 allowing for standing to be established based 
on the reputational harm of not being named on the patent, is a 
decision that is particularly consistent with the credentialing 
function of patents.420  
None of this suggests that patent law should only consider the 
credentialing function of patents in determining the proper shape 
of the law; that would be absurd.421 Surely the conventional 
economic function of patents must be more important than the pat 
on the head that being named an inventor offers.422 And yet, this 
Article suggests that by serving as a valuable credential, patents 
do provide some motivation beyond the purely exclusionary for 
inventors to invent.423 That motivation is in some sense, 
economic — functioning as a credential, a patent can show the value 
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of an individual to an employer or potential investor.424 But it also 
extends beyond the purely monetary in ways that may motivate 
flesh and blood human beings to seek out patents.425 
In the end, what we offer here is a lens through which to view 
patents, one that moves away from the conventional focus on 
patents as exclusionary mechanisms. We close with an emphasis 
on our central thesis that patents are credentialsformal 
abstractions of a person’s inventive nature. It is precisely because 
of their formalization that patents have such power to capture 
mind and emotion. 
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